Federal Britain - the case for decentralisation by Booth, Philip Mark
Philip BOOTH
Foreword by Ilya Somin
FEDERAL 
BRITAIN
The case for decentralisation
Federal Britain
This publication is based on research that forms part of 
the Paragon Initiative.
This five-year project will provide a fundamental reassessment 
of what government should – and should not – do. It will put 
every area of government activity under the microscope and 
analyse the failure of current policies.
The project will put forward clear and considered solutions to 
the UK’s problems. It will also identify the areas of government 
activity that can be put back into the hands of individuals, 
families, civil society, local government, charities and markets.
The Paragon Initiative will create a blueprint for a better, 
freer Britain – and provide a clear vision of a new relationship 
between the state and society.
FEDERAL BRITAIN
The Case for Decentralisation
PHILIP BOOTH
 
First published in Great Britain in 2015 by
The Institute of Economic Affairs
2 Lord North Street
Westminster
London SW1P 3LB
in association with London Publishing Partnership Ltd
www.londonpublishingpartnership.co.uk
The mission of the Institute of Economic Affairs is to improve understanding 
of the fundamental institutions of a free society by analysing and expounding 
the role of markets in solving economic and social problems.
Copyright © The Institute of Economic Affairs 2015
The moral right of the author has been asserted.
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved 
above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced 
into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (elec-
tronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior 
written permission of both the copyright owner and the publisher of this book.
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-0-255-36714-1 (interactive PDF)
Many IEA publications are translated into languages other 
than English or are reprinted. Permission to translate or to reprint 
should be sought from the Director General at the address above.
Typeset in Kepler by T&T Productions Ltd
www.tandtproductions.com
vCONTENTS
The author  viii
Foreword  ix
Acknowledgement  xiii
Summary  xiv
List of tables, figures and boxes  xviii
1 Introduction  1
Problems with the UK constitutional settlement  2
UK constitutional reform and decentralisation  6
2 Local government and devolution: 
the British constitutional settlement  12
Devolution – the background  12
Local government and fiscal centralisation in the 
UK – the background  14
The centralisation of revenue raising  17
Problems caused by the devolution settlement  19
3 The problems of fiscal centralisation and 
the benefits of decentralisation  27
Tiebout sorting  27
Confused representation and voter ignorance  28
Local government elections can be abused  31
The absence of foot voting  33
Other disadvantages of fiscal centralisation  35
CON T E N TS
vi
Benefits of fiscal decentralisation – the evidence  37
The benefits of reform in the UK  41
4 International experience: the example of 
Spain  43
Progressive devolution with asymmetries  43
Problems with Spain’s devolution settlement  47
Lessons for the UK  49
5 Dealing with the English question: 
half-baked solutions  52
English votes for English laws (EVEL)  52
Reducing the number of non-English members of 
parliament  54
Devolution within England  55
6 A federal solution to the English problem  58
Functions of the federal government  58
Functions of national (Scottish and RUK) governments  64
Synchronising economics and politics  65
Federal, UK and Scottish parliaments  66
Preventing re-centralisation of power  67
Ensuring no bailouts  71
Objections to a federal solution  73
7 Further fiscal decentralisation: 
spending and regulatory responsibilities  76
Principle to be followed  76
Decentralisation in practice  79
8 Further fiscal decentralisation: 
revenue raising  87
Local authority revenue-raising requirements  87
CON T E N TS
vii
Local authority revenue sources  88
Redistribution  90
Local government borrowing rules  93
9 Conclusion  95
References  99
About the IEA  104
viii
THE AUTHOR
Philip Booth
Philip Booth is Editorial and Programme Director at the 
Institute of Economic Affairs and Professor of Finance, Pub-
lic Policy and Ethics at St Mary’s University, Twickenham. 
Previously, he was Professor of Insurance and Risk Manage-
ment at Cass Business School. He also worked for the Bank 
of England as an advisor on financial stability issues and 
has been Associate Dean of Cass Business School. He has 
written widely, including a number of books, on investment, 
finance, social insurance and pensions as well as on the re-
lationship between Catholic social teaching and economics. 
Philip has a BA in economics from the University of Durham 
and a PhD from City University. He is a Fellow of the Insti-
tute of Actuaries and a Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society.
ix
FOREWORD
Relative to many other states, the United Kingdom over 
the last century has been a highly successful multinational 
polity. Even the tragic Troubles of Northern Ireland paled 
in comparison with the ethnic and religious conflicts that 
have torn apart so many other nations. Historically, the 
British have often been sceptical of American and conti-
nental European proclivities for trying to solve political 
problems with formal constitutional arrangements. They 
have instead usually preferred the more informal British 
tradition of muddling through under the nation’s unwrit-
ten constitution. Most of the time that tradition has argu-
ably served the UK well.
In recent years, however, the future viability of the 
UK has been called into question by the growing conflict 
between relatively left-wing Scots and the more right-of-
centre electorate in England. Although independence was 
defeated in the September 2014 Scottish referendum, seces-
sionist sentiment might well be rekindled in the aftermath 
of the Conservative Party’s surprising victory in the 2015 UK 
election, which also saw massive gains for the pro-independ-
ence Scottish National Party in Scotland. As English and 
Scottish views on the role of government in society become 
increasingly divergent, the pressure on the UK political sys-
tem might well increase, perhaps even to breaking point. 
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These developments have led many to consider the possi-
bility that Britain might need some more formal system 
of federalism to survive. Proposals for a more federal and 
decentralised UK have been advanced on both the left and 
the right in the hope that they might resolve the seeming 
impasse in which the nation finds itself. The ultimate res-
olution of these issues is important not only to the peoples 
of Britain, but also to many elsewhere. A successful settle-
ment of the UK’s constitutional issues might well be a model 
from which others can learn. It might also create important 
benefits for Britain’s partners in the European Union, and 
its overseas allies, including my own country. Failure might 
have ripple effects on the European Union and beyond.
Philip Booth’s important contribution to the debate over 
Britain’s constitutional future is both timely and insightful. 
As he effectively demonstrates, a greater decentralisation 
of power in Britain might not only reduce the intensity of 
political conflict, but also strengthen the economy, and offer 
English, Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish alike a greater 
range of political choice through foot voting. Britons of all 
national groups would have enhanced opportunities to live 
under the policies they prefer by voting with their feet for 
those jurisdictions that adopt them. As he outlines, foot vot-
ers generally have better incentives to make informed and 
logical decisions than conventional ballot box voters.
Booth also effectively argues that devolution of power 
works best if coupled with a matching devolution of fis-
cal responsibility. Local and regional authorities will not 
have good incentives to adopt effective policies unless they 
must pay for them out of their own tax revenue. If a local or 
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regional government can force taxpayers elsewhere to pay 
for its mistakes, it is likely to make more of them. It will 
also have much weaker incentives to adopt policies that 
are attractive to taxpaying citizens. By contrast, a govern-
ment that must raise its own revenue sources has a strong 
incentive to compete for residents by adopting policies 
that are both cost-conscious and effective.
The result of such competition and foot voting will not 
automatically be a small-government, libertarian-oriented 
polity. Interventionist regions might also prosper in inter-
jurisdictional competition if their higher levels of taxation 
and regulation create sufficient off-setting benefits to 
attract residents and investors. The key point is that both 
left- and right-wing sub-national governments will have to 
find ways to make themselves more attractive to foot voters.
Few will agree with every single detail of Booth’s pro-
posal. Ultimately, any successful federal system for Britain 
will have to be the product of negotiation between the dif-
ferent regions and peoples of the UK. Not even the best and 
most insightful academics and policy analysts can fully 
predict the details of such a settlement in advance. 
But Philip Booth’s paper is an outstanding contribu-
tion to the discussion of these issues, and deserves careful 
consideration from those interested in the constitutional 
future of Britain.
Ilya Somin
Law professor at George Mason University and author of 
Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter
October 2015
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SUMMARY
• The United Kingdom’s current devolution settlement 
leads to unrepresentative government and has an 
inbuilt bias towards ‘big government’. This situation 
is exacerbated because nations with devolved 
government are over-represented in the UK parliament 
compared with their population, when it might be 
expected that they would be under-represented.
• The UK has the most centralised government of the 
G7, as measured by the proportion of revenue raised 
by sub-central government. In the UK, only 5 per cent 
of revenue is raised locally, compared with 50 per cent 
in Canada and 13 per cent in France, which is the next 
most centralised country by this measure.
• Measured by the proportion of total government 
spending undertaken by sub-central government, the 
UK does not fare quite as badly. However, it is among 
a group of three countries in which between 20 and 
30 per cent of all government spending takes place 
at sub-central central government levels – this is 
much less than the G7 average. A further indication 
of the degree of centralisation in the UK is the fact 
that, in 2011, local authorities had over 1,300 statutory 
duties laid down by parliament. In other words, local 
government has substantial spending responsibilities, 
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but very often these involve fulfilling statutory 
obligations.
• There are a number of benefits from decentralising 
government, e.g. it promotes greater experimentation, 
better matching of services to local preferences and 
greater competition between providers of government-
funded services.
• Theory is confirmed by the evidence. Fiscal 
decentralisation is associated with higher national 
income, better school performance and higher levels 
of investment. In particular, the decentralisation 
of revenue-raising powers has a stronger effect on 
performance than the decentralisation of spending. 
The evidence suggests that increasing the local share 
of taxation from 5 per cent to 20 per cent (still low by 
G7 standards) could raise GDP per capita by 6 per cent. 
With especially low levels of revenue decentralisation, 
and as a large country, the UK is in a particularly 
good position to gain from transferring powers and 
revenue-raising responsibilities from central to local 
government.
• The UK needs to reform in two areas. Firstly, a federal 
state should be created with Scotland and either the 
rest of the UK (RUK), or England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland separately, becoming nations within a federal 
union. The federal government should have a very 
limited number of powers including defence, foreign 
affairs and border control and a small parliament and 
executive. No other proposed solution to the ‘English 
question’ can provide the same stability or beneficial 
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economic outcomes. Secondly, there should be radical 
decentralisation of powers within Scotland and RUK 
to local government. The principle that should be 
followed is that of ‘subsidiarity’: this does not mean 
central government pushing powers downwards while 
keeping ultimate control. Rather, control should be at 
the local level unless functions cannot be performed 
locally. Current UK government proposals to devolve 
powers to cities do not deal with the problems 
identified by this research and may well exacerbate 
them.
• Federal states have a tendency towards centralisation, 
the US being an important example. Centralisation 
would be prevented by requiring unanimity among 
the parliaments of all the individual nations as well as 
agreement of the federal parliament before any further 
powers were passed to the federal (UK) level.
• Within the federal nations, responsibility for the 
following should be transferred from national 
government to the local level: environmental policy; 
working-age welfare; education and health; granting 
of permissions for and regulation of natural resource 
exploitation; lifestyle regulation; policing; and housing 
and planning. Local authorities could join together to 
provide some functions, such as policing, where local 
geography or other circumstances make that desirable. 
In addition, there should be complementary reforms to 
promote autonomy for individuals, families and civil 
society institutions, especially in relation to health 
and education.
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• Except for working-age welfare, which would be largely 
financed by government grant but administered by 
local government, all local government functions 
would be financed entirely by local revenue streams. 
These would come from user charges and from some 
combination of the following, to be determined at 
local level: taxes modelled on the current council tax; 
land value taxes; taxes on business property; natural 
resource levies; consumption taxes; variation in 
income taxes; and tourist taxes.
• Two crucial principles must be applied when 
implementing these proposals. Firstly, revenue 
must be raised by the layer of government that 
is undertaking spending. Secondly, one layer of 
government must not bail out the debts incurred 
by any other layer of government. To prevent the 
problems seen in the euro zone, the central bank 
would not accept Scottish or RUK (or English, Welsh 
and Northern Irish if appropriate) bonds as collateral 
in monetary policy operations.
xviii
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11 INTRODUCTION
The current UK constitutional arrangements with regard 
to devolution and local government are a mess. In itself, 
this might not be a problem. Many aspects of the UK 
government have evolved rather than being rationally de-
signed. That is the nature of a country without a written 
constitution and which has a common law tradition. How-
ever, in the case of devolution and local government, there 
has not been a process of evolution designed to deal with 
problems as they arise, but rather a gradual centralisation 
(in the case of local government functions) together with 
asymmetric reform (in the case of devolution) that has 
resulted from political pressures and actions borne more 
from opportunism than from principle or an analysis of 
the economic costs and benefits.
No comparable country is as centralised as the UK 
when it comes to the distribution of functions and reve-
nue-raising powers between central and local govern-
ment. We also have a devolution settlement which gives 
wide-ranging powers to some parts of the UK and not 
others, and which separates decisions about spending 
from the consequences of those decisions in terms of the 
necessary levels of taxation.
INTRODUCTION
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Problems with the UK constitutional 
settlement
Devolution
The UK’s devolution settlement has created a situation in 
which large numbers of members of parliament vote on 
matters that do not concern their constituents. In other 
words, there is representation without taxation, rather like 
in the case of rotten and pocket boroughs before the 1832 
Reform Act. It also happens that those nations of Britain 
that tend to be more supportive of higher levels of regula-
tion and government spending have the greatest number 
of devolved powers. This creates an asymmetric bias in 
the UK parliament towards higher levels of government 
intervention. If the UK as a whole votes for a low-spending 
government, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland can 
still choose a high-spending government. On the other 
hand, if England votes for a low-spending government (as 
indicated by a majority of MPs being elected in England 
for a party that wishes to reduce government spending), it 
may well have a high-spending government imposed on it 
by electors in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
By any metric, the nations to which powers have been 
devolved have much higher levels of government spending 
than England. The non-English MPs have an incentive to try 
to maintain such levels of spending and to increase spending 
further if that spending will not be financed by their constit-
uents. Of course, any MP has an incentive to try to ensure 
more spending on things that benefit their constituents that 
is financed by taxpayers in general (see, for example, Tullock 
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1976). However, the interests of the non-English MPs are 
strongly aligned around this particular objective. They all 
have a very strong interest in maintaining the current gov-
ernment spending settlement whereby additional spending 
outside England is financed by taxpayers in general (that 
is, mainly by English taxpayers). When such a large body of 
representatives has strongly aligned interests around a sin-
gle objective, it is much more difficult to prevent it achieving 
its goals – this is particularly so if that group holds the bal-
ance of power in parliament. Indeed, throughout the last 30 
years, we have seen a number of particular concessions to 
the Celtic nations of the UK, including promises that have 
been made by the current government not to reform the 
Barnett formula, which determines government spending 
in the UK nations.
These problems are further exacerbated by the fact that 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are over-represented 
in the UK parliament despite many of the decisions made 
by that parliament having no bearing on those nations. 
For example, in England, there are nearly 30 per cent more 
electors per parliamentary seat than there are in Wales. 
Thus, an extra impetus is given to the big government bias.
Overall, therefore, the devolution settlement creates 
unrepresentative government and is likely to create a bias 
towards big government.
Local government and fiscal centralisation
As measured by the proportion of revenue raised by 
sub-central government, the UK has the most centralised 
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political system of all comparable countries. In the UK, 
just 5 per cent of revenue is raised by local government. 
The figures in other countries range from 13 per cent in 
France to 50 per cent in Canada.
Such a level of fiscal centralisation gives rise to a num-
ber of difficulties. The first is that the package of goods and 
services – in terms of both the amount of goods and ser-
vices provided and the make-up of that package – cannot 
be easily varied according to local need. For example, it 
is highly likely that the form of assistance that should be 
given to unemployed people in Huntingdon would be very 
different from the form of assistance that needs to be given 
to the unemployed in Hackney in London. Preferences 
when it comes to education, the regulation of activities 
such as shopping, gambling or drinking, and so on, will 
also vary across the country.
Moreover, because the system is so centralised, local 
government cannot be disciplined by constituents mov-
ing between local government areas. It is much easier 
for people to move from, for example, Oxford to Banbury 
or from Bristol to Taunton than it is to leave the coun-
try altogether. The absence of what is described below 
as foot voting leads to three further problems. Firstly, 
an important discipline on government is lost, both 
in terms of providing higher-quality services and also 
in terms of providing services at the lowest possible 
cost in terms of taxation. Secondly, knowledge about 
the preferences of voters is less easily communicated 
to their representatives. Thirdly, there is likely to be a 
lack of experimentation and the copying and diffusion 
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of good practice. Indeed, any differences between local 
provision in different areas is often heavily criticised by 
the media and such differences were named ‘postcode 
lotteries’ by the Blair governments. The other side of 
allowing differences, however, is that services can be 
better matched to local preferences and there is an in-
centive for services to be better everywhere even if there 
are differences in performance.
These theoretical problems with centralisation are 
confirmed by the evidence. In the limited situations where 
foot voting can be exercised, residents are indeed active. 
It is clear that local residents do move house – and pay a 
premium – in order to live in the catchment areas of bet-
ter schools. The detailed empirical studies suggest that 
fiscal decentralisation leads to better economic outcomes 
as measured by factor productivity, investment, school 
performance and national income. Of course, many of the 
benefits of decentralisation, such as better public services 
or public services being better matched to the preferences 
of residents, will not be captured by statistical studies be-
cause national income statistics tend to measure the con-
tribution of public services to national income by counting 
inputs rather than by assessing the value of outputs to 
residents.
One study discussed below, for example, finds that 
doubling the share of sub-central taxes or spending shares 
is likely to be associated with an increase in per capita 
GDP of around 3 per cent. The same author suggests that, 
if the UK raised the same proportion of tax revenue at the 
sub-national level as Sweden, it would increase national 
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income by 4 per cent. The evidence can best be summed 
up by the Lyons report into local government financing, 
which concluded (Lyons 2007: Executive Summary 33):
Recent work comparing the UK with the USA and Eur-
ope has concluded that the lack of devolution and local 
discretion in the UK is a constraint on economic perfor-
mance, particularly in the cities.
Interestingly, the academic evidence suggests that the UK 
has the worst of all possible circumstances – revenue raising 
is much more centralised than spending. The evidence sug-
gests that this combination tends to lead to higher levels of 
government spending. This is not surprising given the lack 
of accountability that would exist within such a system. Fur-
thermore, if local government is simply spending central gov-
ernment grants, it becomes a powerful lobby group lobbying 
for higher grants, rather than a part of government raising 
revenue to provide services valued by its citizens.
Both theory and evidence suggest that, with its high 
levels of revenue centralisation combined with moderate 
levels of spending centralisation, the UK is in an especially 
good position to benefit from reform. What should be done?
UK constitutional reform and decentralisation
Constitutional reform
This paper proposes a federal solution to the UK devolution 
dilemma. Scotland and the rest of the UK (RUK) would 
form two nations within a federal structure; alternatively, 
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Scotland and any combination of England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland either together or separately could be the 
nations within a federal structure. Which nations would 
be independent within the federal structure would be de-
cided at the outset by the electorates of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. For ease of exposition, it will be 
assumed that the nations within the federal structure are 
Scotland and RUK.
The federal government would have responsibility for a 
very small number of functions, such as defence, foreign 
affairs and the management of the existing debt. These 
would be financed by a specific federal tax. There would 
be a small federal executive and a small federal parliament 
that would meet not nearly as frequently as the current 
UK parliament. To prevent centralisation, which has been 
a huge difficulty in federal arrangements, such as the US, 
and in intergovernmental arrangements, such as the EU, 
unanimous agreement of all the nations within the federal 
structure as well as agreement of the federal parliament 
would be necessary for further powers to be passed up to 
the federal level. It would be the lower levels of government 
that would decide what was passed up to the higher levels, 
not the other way round.
This arrangement would remove all the anomalies and 
asymmetries within the current devolution settlement. It 
would also ensure that each level of government and each 
nation was entirely responsible for raising revenue for all 
the functions for which they were responsible. There would 
be strict rules in relation to borrowing at both the national 
and federal levels.
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Decentralisation
The federal system would mean that the individual nations 
(Scotland and RUK) were responsible for other govern-
ment functions such as health, education, welfare and 
most forms of regulation. This would encompass the lion’s 
share of government spending. It is then further proposed 
that there is radical decentralisation within the nations 
that constitute the federal UK. Specifically, the following 
functions would become the responsibility of local levels of 
government in addition to their current functions:
• environmental policy
• working-age welfare
• education and health
• natural resource exploitation
• lifestyle regulation
• policing
• housing and planning
This list is not exhaustive. For example, some aspects of 
road transport that are not currently a local responsibil-
ity could become so. Also, one of these areas is currently 
already a local responsibility but is administered in such 
a way that proper accountability is impossible (policing). 
In the case of some of these policy areas, there would be 
complementary policies that involved even greater decen-
tralisation. For example, with regard to education, parents 
would be financed directly and the local government role 
would be a residual one. Except for working-age welfare, 
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which would be financed by government grant but ad-
ministered by local government, all of these functions, to-
gether with existing local government functions, would be 
financed entirely by local revenue streams from some com-
bination of the following taxes determined at local level:
• taxes modelled on the current council tax
• land value taxes
• taxes on business property
• natural resource levies
• consumption taxes
• tourist taxes
• (possibly) income taxes set at the local level but 
collected nationally
The relationship between revenue raising and spending 
would then be very clear.
Decentralisation would be combined with strict rules 
to ensure that local government debt was controlled and 
that local government was explicitly accountable for its 
own debt. Further decentralisation to lower levels of local 
government would be encouraged.
Overall, this is a radical programme of reform that both 
theory and evidence suggest is capable of transforming the 
political economy of Britain as well as producing much 
better economic outcomes. Other proposals, such as ‘Eng-
lish votes for English laws’ in the UK parliament or reduc-
ing the number of Scottish MPs either do not properly ad-
dress the current problems or would have side effects that 
would make the overall constitutional settlement worse. 
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Furthermore, despite the ad hoc proposals for decentrali-
sation to some areas, such as Manchester, there have been 
no serious proposals for comprehensive decentralisation 
or for revenue-raising decentralisation by the current gov-
ernment.1 A reversal of the process of centralisation that 
has been going on for at least 80 years in the UK is urgently 
needed.
The principle that would be embedded in these reforms 
is that of subsidiarity. This is a concept much misused and 
misunderstood, especially in the EU. It has its roots in 
Catholic social teaching and can be described as follows:2
it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and dis-
turbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations 
can do.
Note that the principle argues that smaller organisations 
should be allowed to do what they can do, not what they are 
most efficient at doing – this implies, among other things, 
that the benefit of the doubt should be in the direction of 
decentralisation. This suggests that the decentralisation 
to local government proposed here should not necessarily 
be the end of the process.
The approach to federalism described here has the 
potential to embrace the principle of subsidiarity fully. 
1 Even the much heralded decentralisation of business rates announced in 
October 2015 comes with many caveats.
2 Quadragesimo anno, 79. See http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/
encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html
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Powers could only be moved upwards if the nations within 
the federal UK decided by unanimity that they could not 
perform the relevant function themselves. The EU would 
have much to gain from applying the principle of subsidi-
arity properly. The UK – which currently is hardly in a 
position to complain about centralisation within the EU 
– should lead the way.
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2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DEVOLUTION: 
THE BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT
Devolution – the background
The UK has been characterised by various forms of devo-
lution throughout its history. However, there was a step 
change in 1999, when the Scottish Parliament and Welsh 
Assembly were formed. Just before that, in 1998, devolved 
government returned to Northern Ireland. The powers 
that have been devolved to each of the nations are not 
the same, and the different nations have used them in 
different ways.
In Scotland, the following matters are devolved:1
• health and social work
• education and training
• local government and housing
• justice and policing
• agriculture, forestry and fisheries
• the environment
• tourism, sport and heritage
• economic development and internal transport
1 https://www.gov.uk/devolution-settlement-scotland
LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
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Spending decisions, organisational issues and the 
passing of primary legislation in these areas have all been 
devolved. The devolved matters cover a large proportion 
of government activity, with the major exception of wel-
fare. By comparison with spending powers, however, rev-
enue-raising powers are limited. The original devolution 
settlement, and then the Scotland Act 2012, gave the Scot-
tish government the power to vary income tax and also 
vary some other, minor taxes. However, revenue raising is 
essentially still a matter for the UK government.
Following the referendum on Scottish independence in 
September 2014, further proposals were made for devolu-
tion. The measures that were proposed by the Conservative 
Party in the 2015 election campaign included requiring that 
50 per cent of revenue spent in Scotland was raised in Scot-
land and also the devolution of welfare and further health 
and social matters. These proposals were adopted in the 
Scotland Bill. At time of writing, this is going through par-
liament and will give the Scottish parliament control over 
income tax rates and bands, a half share in Scottish value 
added tax (VAT) revenues and a greater say over welfare 
policy in Scotland. These measures could reduce the extent 
of fiscal centralisation within the UK, but they are also likely 
to exacerbate the problems caused by asymmetries in the 
devolution settlement, which are discussed below. It was 
also proposed in the Conservative manifesto that the Bar-
nett formula (see below) should be maintained and that a 
special funding floor for Wales should be introduced.
As far as spending and the delivery of services are 
concerned, the devolved powers to Wales and Northern 
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Ireland are not significantly different from those in Scot-
land. However, the powers to enact legislation are less 
wide-ranging and there is no control of income tax.
The devolution settlements mirror the arrangements 
within local government in England in that there is far 
more devolution of spending than of revenue raising. As 
will be discussed below, this is probably the worst of all 
possible combinations.
Local government and fiscal centralisation in 
the UK – the background
The UK has something of a ‘patchwork’ system of local gov-
ernment. That is not necessarily a bad thing. Different ap-
proaches to local government may well be appropriate in 
different areas – for example, in urban as compared with 
rural areas. This paper does not propose a reorganisation 
of the structures of local government. Rather, the focus 
of discussion is on the extent to which local government 
should have greater responsibilities devolved from the 
centre.
In England, there are 55 single-tier authorities that 
have responsibility for nearly all local government matters. 
In addition there are 27 non-metropolitan counties, which 
tend to be large areas that have responsibility for education, 
libraries and a number of other areas of expenditure over 
which it is believed that more strategic oversight is needed. 
These counties also contain lower-tier authorities respon-
sible for services such as refuse collection and planning 
applications. There are additional complexities within this 
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system. For example, there are a number of metropolitan 
boroughs which tend to act as unitary authorities. Also, 
the local government arrangements in London are quite 
different from those that exist in the rest of the country. 
There are a few functions undertaken by parish or town 
councils, which tend to represent very small areas and 
have advisory functions as well as some spending powers.
There are ongoing attempts to decentralise author-
ity in a piecemeal way. For example, there are ad hoc 
arrangements such as City Deals. These do not address 
the problems discussed below and, indeed, do not in any 
meaningful way lead to decentralisation. Those areas in-
volved in City Deals often have greater freedom as to how 
they spend government grants. However, they are also 
able to borrow for the purposes of spending more on areas 
where less spending would previously have taken place – 
thus taking economic power from the private sector and 
increasing the power of local government relative to the 
private sector. Furthermore, many of the powers that are 
being given to local authority areas under City Deals in-
volve increased regulation of areas of economic life that 
had been deregulated under previous governments. City 
Deals also often involve moving powers from lower levels 
of local government to more distant levels: for example, 
in the Leeds City Deal, five local authorities are going to 
move to a combined authority model.2 There is no genuine 
attempt under this programme to decentralise revenue 
2 See the government document detailing all the City Deals: https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/221009/
Guide-to-City-Deals-wave-1.pdf
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raising and spending from central to local government. In 
general, City Deals lead to higher levels of spending and 
regulation of local economic activity than would other-
wise have taken place.
Local authority spending under central government 
control
Councils have wide-ranging but constrained powers.  For 
example, they are responsible for: children’s services 
(though not free schools and academies); aspects of high-
ways and transport; social care for adults; housing; plan-
ning; the environment; and fire and rescue services.3 They 
also have some role in the provision of other services that 
are coordinated locally but for which they are not directly 
responsible, such as policing.
In many of these areas, local discretion is limited and 
most local authorities are implementing national govern-
ment guidelines or plans. An indication of local govern-
ment’s subservient role is given by the fact that, in 2011, 
there were over 1,300 local authority statutory duties.4
Thus, the provision of services is heavily circumscribed 
and regulated. By way of example, local authority schools 
must follow the national curriculum, and libraries are sub-
ject to the 1964 Public Libraries and Museums Act (Chap-
ter 75), in which it states:
3 http://www.local.gov.uk/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=a5b2c920 
-8f40-4eae-9852-8b983724f5bc&groupId=10180
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-local 
-government-statutory-duties-summary-of-responses--2
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it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to superintend, 
and promote the improvement of, the public library ser-
vice provided by local authorities in England and Wales, 
and to secure the proper discharge by local authorities of 
the functions in relation to libraries conferred on them 
as library authorities by or under this Act.
As far as the provision of adult and children’s services 
is concerned, local authorities effectively carry out legis-
lative duties as laid down in acts of parliament. There is 
even a special government fund to enable local author-
ities to empty dustbins once a week rather than once a 
fortnight.
The centralisation of revenue raising
When it comes to taxation, or revenue raising, the extent 
of central control is even greater than that over spending. 
Furthermore, the modest decentralisation to areas such as 
Manchester barely affects revenue raising.
Even the one tax that is levied and determined by local 
councils is heavily regulated by central government. The 
government provided funding of £5.2 billion between 2010 
and 2015 to freeze council tax,5 and councils are unable 
to update valuations, use alternative taxes or even change 
the council tax banding system within a local area. There 
is even less local discretion with regard to business rates, 
5 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government 
-policy-council-tax-reform/2010-to-2015-government-policy-council-tax 
-reform
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the other main tax designed to finance local government, 
which is administered and set by central government, 
though business rates will be deregulated somewhat 
under proposals made in October 2015.
Measured by the percentage of tax revenue raised at 
sub-national level, the UK has by far the lowest level of 
tax autonomy for local government among comparable 
countries. According to Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD) figures, in 2011, 4.8 per 
cent of all tax was raised locally. This is on a par with (or 
slightly higher than) Slovakia and the Netherlands, which 
are much smaller than the UK. Countries that are more 
similar to the UK raise much more of their taxes below 
central government level as a proportion of the total tax 
take. For example, France (13 per cent), Italy (16 per cent), 
the US (37  per cent) and Germany (29  per cent) all raise 
a significantly greater proportion of total taxes at sub- 
national level than the UK (see Table 1).
As can be seen in Table 1, which includes all G7 coun-
tries, the figures for expenditure (except Japan, for which 
such figures are not available) tell a different story. When it 
comes to the extent of government spending administered 
below central government level, the UK is at the low end of 
the spectrum, but not an outlier; though, as noted, local 
government spending is heavily regulated. It is also inter-
esting to note that, as far as we can tell from available fig-
ures, there is a remarkable consistency in the percentage 
of spending at the local level in Italy and France at the two 
dates 1890 and 2013. On the other hand, there has been a 
dramatic fall in the UK.
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Problems caused by the devolution settlement
There are a number of problems with the UK’s devolution 
settlement.
Big government asymmetrical bias
The current political settlement in the UK is asymmetrical 
in the sense that some MPs have responsibility for deter-
mining legislation that does not affect their constituents: 
in other words, we have representation without taxation. 
This, in itself, is not necessarily a problem as long as there 
are accountability and proper checks and balances within 
the system to prevent such biases significantly affecting 
Table 1 Percentage of tax revenue and government spending at 
sub-national level
Country
Percentage of tax 
revenue raised 
at sub-national 
level 2013
Percentage of 
expenditure at sub-
national level 2013
Percentage of 
expenditure at sub-
national level 1890
UK 05 25 43
France 13 21 22
Italy 16 28 25
Japan 25 — —
Germany 29 39 —
US 37 48 62
Canada 50 67 —
Figures for 2013 from OECD Fiscal Decentralisation Database; figures for 1890 from 
Bastable (1895) – there are some potential inaccuracies in the figure for France and there 
may be different definitions used.
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government decisions. However, in the case of the UK, a 
form of devolution has evolved that has a built-in bias 
towards higher levels of government spending than the 
electorate may desire.
The political bias within the UK system is perhaps best 
explained with reference to what became known as the 
West Lothian question. This was raised by Tam Dalyell, 
Member of Parliament for West Lothian, when debating 
the Labour government devolution proposals in 1977. The 
problem manifests itself or can be expressed in various 
ways. For example, Scottish members of parliament can 
vote on matters that only pertain to England and that have 
no effect on their own constituents. Such MPs are rather 
like MPs from rotten or pocket boroughs before the 1832 
Reform Act – the members are not accountable to anybody 
for the decisions they take on a wide range of devolved 
issues, but they can affect policy in constituencies that do 
not elect them.
It is difficult to predict the impact of this situation on 
MPs’ voting behaviour. If MPs do not have vested inter-
ests to protect because a given decision does not affect 
their constituents, they might be less likely to vote for 
interventionist measures. However, the nations to which 
there has been devolution tend to have high levels of gov-
ernment spending relative to taxation. Their MPs would 
have an incentive to maintain high levels of spending not 
financed by their own constituents. Furthermore, under 
the party whipping system, Scottish MPs can simply be 
required to vote with their English colleagues, though 
this is less of a problem since May 2015 as there are only 
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three Scottish MPs who are not members of the Scottish 
National Party. MPs in devolved nations tend dispropor-
tionately to be members of parties that believe in greater 
levels of government spending. As such, these MPs can 
vote for more government spending in England (which 
they do not represent and which may not want more gov-
ernment spending) while also being confident that there 
will be a majority favourable to high levels of government 
spending in the assemblies or parliaments of their own 
nations.
As Packer and Sinclair (2015) pointed out, electorates 
in devolved areas tend to be more likely to favour greater 
government intervention. This also creates an asym-
metric bias in the UK parliament towards higher levels 
of government spending. If the UK as a whole votes for 
a low-spending government, Scotland, Wales and North-
ern Ireland – and perhaps representatives in those parts 
of England that have some devolved powers – can still 
choose a high-spending government. On the other hand, 
if England votes for a low-spending government (as indi-
cated by a majority of MPs being elected in England for 
a party that wishes to reduce government spending), it 
may well have a high-spending government imposed on 
it by electors in the nations to which powers have been 
devolved.
This problem is illustrated by the results of a youGov 
survey in which participants were asked for their view on 
whether the level of spending and taxes should be higher, 
lower or around the same. Voters in Scotland were more 
likely than those in the UK as a whole to say they would 
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prefer higher spending and taxes, and less likely to prefer 
lower spending and taxes (see Figure 1).
Over-representation of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland
The problem of asymmetry is compounded by over-rep-
resentation in the UK parliament of those nations with 
devolved powers. It might be expected that nations with 
devolved powers would have fewer members of the UK 
parliament, but the opposite is the case. Using 2013 figures, 
the mean and median number of electors per seat is shown 
in Table 2.
All the other home nations have higher representation 
than England. In turn, Wales and Northern Ireland have 
Figure 1 The money the government spends on public services 
and other things comes mainly from taxation. Do you 
think…
Total sample size was 1,684 adults. Fieldwork was undertaken 10–11 March 
2013 by YouGov for the TaxPayers’ Alliance. The survey was carried out online. 
The figures were weighted and are representative of all GB adults (aged 18+).
Taken directly from Packer and Sinclair (2015).
Don’t know
the government spends too little and
therefore taxes us too little?
the government spends too much and
therefore taxes us too much?
the government has got the
balance about right?
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Scotland UK
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greater representation than Scotland because their devo-
lution settlements involved the transfer of fewer powers.
Historically, there has been some attempt to alter the 
number of seats allocated between the four nations to take 
account of the extent of devolution. For example, Northern 
Ireland had 13 (reduced to 12) seats during the period of 
devolved power up to 1974. This was then increased after 
direct rule was imposed. The number of Scottish seats was 
also reduced, from 72 to 59, before the 2005 general elec-
tion to reflect its increased devolved powers. Nevertheless, 
Scotland is still over-represented.
Even if the representation of Scotland, Wales and North-
ern Ireland is not decisive in determining the government of 
the UK as a whole, it can still affect the balance of opinion in 
parliament. There have been times, however, when the elec-
tion results in the nations that now have devolved powers 
were decisive. Though Scotland did not have devolved 
powers at that time, in October 1974 the Labour Party’s 
majority in Scotland was far bigger than its majority in the 
UK as a whole. In 2010, the Conservative Party had a very 
clear overall majority in England but not in the UK.
Table 2 Electors per seat in the UK nations
 Nation
Total number 
of electors
Total 
number of 
seats
Mean 
electors 
per seat
Median 
electors per 
seat
England 38,587,100 533 72,396 72,400
Scotland 04,027,200 059 68,258 69,000
Wales 02,297,300 040  57,433 56,800
Northern Ireland 01,218,400 018 67,689 66,800
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High government spending in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland
It has been argued above that the devolution settlement is 
asymmetrical and favours those parts of the UK that have 
supported a larger state. This, in turn, means that there 
will be an artificial bias that will encourage high spending 
and high levels of regulation. High spending in the nations 
that have devolution pre-dated the current settlement and 
it is difficult to argue that devolution is the cause of high 
spending in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. How-
ever, the devolution settlement makes it more likely that 
this situation will continue into the future.
The level of government spending in 2004–5 in the UK, 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is given in 
Table 3 as a proportion of national income at factor cost 
(the most appropriate measure of national income for such 
comparisons). Other figures are given for employment in 
the public sector and also more recent figures for govern-
ment spending per head (in absolute terms and as a per-
centage of the UK average).
Government spending is clearly much higher in the na-
tions with devolved government. One possible explanation 
is that, from long before devolution, Scottish, Welsh and 
Northern Irish representatives in parliament comprised 
well-aligned interest groups6 that could obtain benefits 
while spreading the costs over the whole electorate7. 
6 Applying the argument of Olson (1965).
7 Very particular examples of this include, in 1979, discussions (which broke 
down) between Ulster Unionists and the UK government over the provi-
sion of cheap energy in exchange for support in a confidence motion, and 
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Having gained such concessions, the devolution settle-
ment gives an incentive to the electorate and their repre-
sentatives to maintain and enhance them.
This problem is exacerbated because, when it comes 
to the UK parliament, non-English MPs have interests 
in a relatively small number of issues – the general fiscal 
settlement being one of them. This is because most issues 
of importance have been devolved, while the raising of 
finances to fund the devolved spending has not been de-
volved. The interests of the non-English MPs are likely to 
be closely aligned around the objective of maintaining or 
improving their fiscal settlement. Even members of the UK 
concessions to Plaid Cymru which, did, in fact, secure their support in that 
no confidence vote. See http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/
could-worse-gordon-think-callaghan-2120651. In the 1979 general elec-
tion, both major parties promised a dedicated Welsh language television 
channel and the leader of Plaid Cymru threatened to go on hunger strike if 
the promise was not delivered.
Table 3 Government spending in the UK nations
Government 
spending as 
%  of GDP 
2004–5
Proportion 
of workforce 
in the public 
sector 
2004–5
Government 
spending 
on services 
per head (£) 
2012–13 
Government 
spending on 
services per 
head as % of 
UK average 
2012–13
England 46.0 19.5 08,529 097.1
Scotland 58.5 23.8 10,152 115.5
Wales 67.9 23.3 09,709 110.5
Northern Ireland 75.8 29.8 10,876 123.8
UK 47.2 20.3 08,788 100.1
Source: Smith (2006) and Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (2014, Chapter 9).
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parliament who believed in cutting government spending 
in general may support increases in government spend-
ing for their nations, given that the cost would be spread 
across the UK.
This combination of policies – pre-existing high levels 
of government spending outside England, very little re-
sponsibility for raising the taxes necessary to fund the 
spending and the closely aligned interests of non-English 
members of the UK parliament around the maintenance 
of high spending outside England – compounds the prob-
lems of political asymmetry in the devolution settlement. 
All of these problems point in the direction of encouraging 
the growth of the size of government.
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3 THE PROBLEMS OF FISCAL CENTRALISATION 
AND THE BENEFITS OF DECENTRALISATION
Tiebout sorting
One of the main economic roles of government is the re-
sponsibility for the provision of public goods that cannot 
easily be provided privately.1 The Tiebout (1956) model, 
often known as Tiebout sorting, suggests that there can be 
considerable advantages of fiscal decentralisation. Decen-
tralisation allows local government units to offer different 
packages of public goods that are suited to the different 
preferences of local residents. Thus, decentralisation al-
lows for differences between preferences – the residents 
of Buckingham do not necessarily want the same set of 
public goods as the residents of Liverpool.
Localisation also ensures that local knowledge can 
be exploited by politicians and bureaucrats when de-
termining the desired form of government provision. 
Furthermore, local governments can be disciplined by 
residents, who can move between local areas, thus put-
ting pressure on localities to provide the right level and 
1 Of course, there is substantial evidence that many goods and services that 
are often called ‘public’ goods are often ‘club’ goods and can be provided 
privately. However, we do not pursue that debate here.
FISCAL 
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combination of public goods (see ‘foot voting’ below). As 
Tiebout puts it: ‘Spatial mobility provides the local pub-
lic-goods counterpart to the private market’s shopping 
trip’ (Tiebout 1956: 422) and ‘While the solution may not 
be perfect because of institutional rigidities, this does 
not invalidate its importance’ (ibid.: 424). In addition, 
tax competition can complement competition in pub-
lic good provision and both can help keep government 
more efficient and ensure more appropriate provision of 
public goods. This can work both at the UK level (com-
petition between Scotland and RUK or the other constit-
uent nations) and at the more local level.
Confused representation and voter ignorance
The problem of rational ignorance among electorates is 
widely discussed. In general, voters do not have a strong 
incentive to acquire economic and political knowledge be-
cause there is an infinitesimal probability that their votes 
will affect an election. However, interest groups that are well 
organised and that might have an opportunity to change 
policy have an incentive to campaign and become well in-
formed (again, see Olson 1965). This view is challenged by, 
for example, Byran Caplan (2007), who argues that, rather 
than suffering from rational ignorance, voters are irrational 
and possess several inherent biases that would tend to lead 
to bad policy (for example, biases towards protectionism).
It would appear to be true that there are straightfor-
ward objective issues that voters get wrong or do not un-
derstand. These are not just issues in relation to economic 
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policy. Voters do not even understand for which areas of 
policy the politicians for whom they are voting are respon-
sible. Somin (2013) cites some examples relating to the US:
• In 2006, only 42 per cent of Americans could name the 
three branches of government.
• In the 2010 election, nearly two-thirds of the US 
electorate got the wrong answer when asked if the 
economy had grown in that year.
• In the 2010 election, less than half the electorate 
knew that the Republicans controlled the House of 
Representatives but not the senate.
In the UK, there are similar findings. For example, an 
Ipsos–MORI poll uncovered the following:2
• Nearly 30 per cent of people think the government 
spends more on jobseekers’ allowance than on 
pensions, when in fact the government spends fifteen 
times more on pensions.
• Over one-quarter of people think that foreign aid 
is one of the top two or three items of government 
spending when it actually made up just over 1 per cent 
of government spending in the 2011/12 financial year.
These issues form the battleground for many political 
debates in the UK around election time.
2 https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/ 
3188/Perceptions-are-not-reality-the-top-10-we-get-wrong.aspx
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In many senses, it does not matter whether voters are 
rationally ignorant while interest groups are rationally 
well informed and therefore unduly influence policy or 
whether voters are simply irrational; the policy conclusion 
is the same: we should rely as little as possible on the polit-
ical system for delivering economic goals.
Unfortunately, the UK political system is especially well 
designed to exacerbate the effects of voter ignorance.
Firstly, our system is complex. It is possible, in England, 
to vote in the elections for the following layers of govern-
ment, all of which exercise some power: European Union; 
UK parliament; county council; district council; parish or 
town council. In some parts of the country, some of these 
layers do not exist or are replaced with different layers, but 
in many parts of the country there are five layers of gov-
ernment – four of which only raise 5 per cent of revenue 
between them. In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
there are also devolved authorities, though the structure 
of local government is somewhat different. This complex-
ity compounds the voter ignorance problem: it is simply 
more difficult for voters to understand who controls 
what. Avoiding complexity does not mean that different 
approaches to local government should not be used in dif-
ferent areas of the country. Complexity of the system as a 
whole matters less than complexity of the arrangements 
relating to a particular local government area.
The system of government in the UK is also highly 
centralised, as discussed above. This leads to two further 
problems related to voter ignorance. The larger the govern-
mental unit, the smaller the chance of an individual elector 
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influencing an election, so individuals have less incentive 
to be well informed. In addition to this, as has been noted, 
the UK is much more highly centralised when it comes to 
revenue raising than with regard to spending. Moreover, 
spending is often localised in theory, but in practice it is dic-
tated by government guidelines and regulation. All of these 
factors make it much more difficult to ascertain which layer 
of government is responsible for what functions.
The following approaches could ameliorate the problem 
of voter ignorance:
• Limiting the functions of government so that 
individuals and civil society organisations are 
responsible for a greater number of important 
economic decisions. This makes it easier to assess the 
performance of government over the narrower range 
of activities for which it is responsible.
• Decentralising power so that smaller units are 
responsible for a greater number of powers.
• Making clearer the powers of different levels of 
government.
Local government elections can be abused
A further problem arising from our centralised system is 
that voters can use local elections to send messages to na-
tional government. This can be done at little cost in terms 
of bad policy at the local level given the relative unimpor-
tance of the powers exercised by local government.3
3 This does suggest rational behaviour on the part of voters.
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It does appear that, in practice, local elections are used 
to punish national governments. For example, in the 1993 
county council elections,4 the ruling Conservative Party 
lost every single county except for one (Buckinghamshire). 
However, by 2009,5 the party controlled all but eight coun-
ties in England. These results cannot plausibly reflect the 
independent performance of county council administra-
tions at these times. During the period of Labour govern-
ment from 1997 to 2010, there were local elections in most 
years. In these elections, the Labour Party polled between 
7 and 16 percentage points fewer than they did in the pre-
vious general election (see Mellows-Facer 2006). There is 
an almost identical pattern in relation to the Conservative 
Party between 1979 and 1997.
Overall, this is an extraordinary picture. It suggests ei-
ther that voters are confusing UK parliamentary election 
issues with issues relevant to other layers of government 
or that they are using the other layers of government to 
register what they believe is a costless mid-term protest 
against the Westminster government of the day. If local 
government has few powers, of course, voters may be cor-
rect that their actions are costless. However, this picture 
also suggests that changes of government at the local level 
will happen almost randomly, as determined by the perfor-
mance of government at the national level.
4 The mid-term of a Conservative government.
5 Towards the end of a Labour government.
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The absence of foot voting
While voters are relatively uninformed about political 
issues, people who migrate from one political jurisdiction 
to another have a strong incentive to be highly informed 
about what they are doing. People do not need sophisti-
cated knowledge when moving from one governmental 
jurisdiction to another – they only need relevant know-
ledge about whether one area is better than another from 
their perspective. What Somin (2013) calls ‘foot voting’ is 
more effective in disciplining government than ballot box 
voting. Firstly, those who choose to move area only need 
to acquire information about the range of things that is 
directly relevant to the decision. Secondly, there is a much 
stronger incentive to evaluate that information in a ra-
tional and unbiased way given that those making the de-
cision will face the full financial consequences and other 
consequences of their actions. At the very least, foot voting 
allows individuals to move from an area where govern-
ment is performing badly to an area where it is performing 
better, even if it does not improve the poorly performing 
government.
We can see that foot voting is practical by observing 
how parents move home to try to obtain better schools 
for their children. For example, polling research in the 
UK suggests that nearly one-third of parents have moved 
house in England to be in the catchment area for a good 
school and 10 per cent are willing to pay in excess of an 
additional £50,000 for a property in a desirable school 
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catchment  area.6 Thus, it is clear that people move to get 
better services when they are able to do so.
Somin (2013) shows how people have been able to 
vote with their feet even in the most difficult conditions. 
However, the structure of the UK government does raise 
considerable barriers to foot voting being effective. For 
example, centralisation – often promoted by fears of 
differences arising between local service provision in dif-
ferent areas of the country or postcode lotteries – leads 
to greater similarity in service provision across the 
country.7 Even where service provision can vary, the fact 
that spending decisions are often devolved without tax 
decisions being devolved enables some areas of the UK to 
spend more per head, effectively financed by other areas 
of the UK; thus, gains from providing services effectively 
and efficiently are reduced. Indeed, foot voting can send 
the wrong signals in the UK system: for example, English 
voters have an incentive to move to Scotland to receive 
free long-term care for the elderly or free university tui-
tion financed by the taxpayers of the UK as a whole. The 
very process of centralisation perhaps breeds a dynamic 
that causes people to think that services should be the 
same everywhere, even those services nominally con-
trolled by local government.
6 http://www.propertywire.com/news/europe/uk-families-move-schools 
-201409099567.html
7 Though there is some difference in school performance (Ofsted 2013) and 
there are also differences in healthcare performance between England and 
the other nations (Bevan et al. 2014).
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Of course, foot voting is not a cure-all for bad policy. 
There are, for example, costs of moving between jurisdic-
tions. However, as Somin (2014) suggests, these costs are 
not necessarily large relative to the benefits and tend to be 
lower for the less-well-off, who do not own property. The 
decentralisation proposed below will tend to lower the 
costs of foot voting – there is no pretence that they can 
be reduced to zero. It is also frequently suggested that 
there can be a race to the bottom as a result of local areas 
lowering taxes to attract population or to reduce the like-
lihood that citizens will move. However, this is unlikely. If 
services are efficiently provided and of value to local citi-
zens they will have no reason to move. People do not move 
on the basis of tax rates alone – as has been noted above 
in relation to schooling. Sometimes a jurisdiction might 
lower taxes on mobile factors of production and raise them 
on immobile factors of production, thereby exploiting the 
ability of different factors of production to vote with their 
feet. However, that is less likely given the constraints on 
the shape of the tax base proposed below.
Other disadvantages of fiscal centralisation
If spending is decentralised without taxation being de-
centralised, the ability of a local authority to grow its tax 
base by following good policy is reduced. More generally, 
as Sinclair (2014) argues, if local governments do not raise 
their own revenue, they have no incentive to grow their tax 
base by following policies that are favourable to business 
and attractive to the local population. Innovation can 
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also be reduced in centralised systems. And if grants are 
ring-fenced by government and have to be used for specific 
purposes, there is very limited scope for experimentation. 
These problems can be exacerbated where central gov-
ernment allocates grants according to complex formulae 
which may, in fact, benefit local authorities that are in pop-
ulation decline or in economic and social decline. Indeed, 
as we shall suggest below, decentralisation of spending 
combined with centralised revenue raising may produce 
the worst results.
Blöchliger (2013: 8–9) argues that decentralisation 
leads to two main benefits. It will increase the productivity 
of all government spending because mobile factors of pro-
duction (foot voters) can discipline local government. Fur-
thermore, the spending that does take place is likely to be 
on more important services that are valued by businesses 
and residents. Local authorities can experiment and other 
local authorities can copy policies that work.
Tax decentralisation also allows local authorities to 
choose a tax and charging mix that is more closely aligned 
to providing appropriate public goods within the relevant 
area. For example, a tourist tax on hotel occupants, if care-
fully spent and not set at levels that are too high, can both 
offset the costs tourists impose on an area and help pay 
for public goods related to tourism (maps, tourist informa-
tion centres, hill paths, clean beaches and so on), which it 
might not be feasible to finance through direct charges.
In a more decentralised political system it is not only 
residents who are able to compare local services and taxes, 
politicians can do so too when holding administrators 
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to account (see Tullock 1976). In general, politicians may 
be less responsive to voters than businesses are to con-
sumers; however, they do have an incentive to provide bet-
ter services at a given cost. With more local government 
responsibility, politicians (as well as voters and residents) 
can compare outcomes in different parts of the country 
with a view to more effectively holding to account the 
bureaucracy that is delivering the services.
As Tullock also points out, fiscal decentralisation makes 
logrolling (or, more generally, the problem of a small num-
ber of voters imposing upon all voters increased taxes to 
finance spending that benefits relatively few people) more 
difficult. If a particular city, such as Manchester, wishes 
to improve infrastructure, build museums and theatres 
or new schools and hospitals, and so on, at taxpayer ex-
pense, under a decentralised political system it would be 
the taxpayers of Manchester who would bear the cost. The 
voters of Manchester would not be able to benefit from 
these things while imposing the costs on the taxpayers of 
the country as a whole – they would have to bear the costs 
themselves.
Benefits of fiscal decentralisation – 
the evidence
There is a significant amount of evidence that fiscal decen-
tralisation increases economic performance over a range 
of indicators. For example, Blöchliger (2013) finds that 
fiscal decentralisation is associated with higher national 
income, better school performance and higher levels of 
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investment (both physical investment and investment in 
human capital). In particular, he finds, consistent with 
Ashworth et al. (2013) (see below), that the decentralisation 
of revenue-raising powers has a stronger effect on perfor-
mance than the decentralisation of spending.
The effects of decentralisation are strong. Blöchliger 
(2013: 3) finds that: 
Doubling sub-central tax or spending shares (e.g. in-
creasing the ratio of sub-central to general government 
tax revenue from 6 to 12%) is associated with a GDP per 
capita increase of around 3%. 
It should be noted that it cannot be assumed that a huge 
step change in a particular country would replicate this 
result. However, UK sub-central tax revenue is less than 
half of that in France and only one-tenth of that in Canada, 
so this does suggest substantial benefits from decentral-
isation. Overall, taking into account the fact that the 
relationship between decentralisation and economic per-
formance is non-linear, Blöchliger suggests that, if the UK 
raised the same proportion of tax revenue at sub-national 
level as Sweden, it would increase national income by 4 per 
cent. However, the most significant gains would come 
from the initial reductions in the proportion of revenue 
raised centrally.
There is a great deal of other evidence on the benefits 
of decentralisation and the Lyons report into local gov-
ernment financing (Lyons 2007: Executive Summary 33) 
concluded: 
F I SCA L C E N T R A L I S AT ION A N D DEC E N T R A L I S AT ION 
39
Recent work comparing the UK with the USA and Eur-
ope has concluded that the lack of devolution and local 
discretion in the UK is a constraint on economic perfor-
mance, particularly in the cities.
Nevertheless, the picture is not completely straightfor-
ward. Ashworth et al. (2013) have studied the impact of 
spending localisation and tax localisation on the size of 
government. They find that the decentralisation of spend-
ing tends to lead to bigger government – that is higher gov-
ernment spending. On the other hand, decentralisation of 
taxation can lead to smaller government.
This conclusion is consistent with other studies. For ex-
ample, work by the IMF (specifically, Cottarelli 2009) con-
firms the above results while making the additional point 
that it is important for fiscal discipline to be maintained 
in the sub-national government areas (through fiscal rules 
or credible no-bailout mechanisms, which ensure that 
sub-national governments can go bankrupt). Furthermore, 
it is also important that local government has the admin-
istrative capacity to raise and spend revenue.
Overall, the evidence would suggest that decentralisa-
tion would help economic performance, especially if the 
focus were on revenue raising with fiscal discipline being 
maintained.
But, does fiscal decentralisation lead to a race to the 
bottom with local governments that fear voter migration 
due to high taxes providing inadequate services? There is, 
in fact, no reason to assume there would be a race to the 
bottom if local authorities have more revenue-raising and 
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spending powers. While local authorities may compete to 
have lower tax rates and provide fewer services, as Tiebout 
(1956) points out, many of the services that local govern-
ment provides have ‘public good’ characteristics. It might 
be the case that such services would be better provided by 
the private sector but, insofar as this is not the case, busi-
nesses and residents are likely to prefer the best package 
of services and revenue raising rather than the smallest 
package of services. Of course, residents would also prefer 
a given package of services to be provided at the lowest 
cost. The incentives are more likely to be aligned with 
the achievement of this objective if both tax raising and 
service provision take place at a local level. Blöchliger and 
Campos (2011) confirm this result, arguing that ‘a race to 
the bottom cannot be observed.’
In common with the studies cited above, Thießen (2003) 
finds that fiscal decentralisation is growth promoting. 
However, when fiscal decentralisation reaches high levels, 
it can reduce growth. Indeed, it is clear that there must 
come a point when some public goods are more efficiently 
provided on a national scale, so this result is not surprising.
More generally, the evidence regarding fiscal decentral-
isation is not all in one direction. It is possible that fiscal 
decentralisation has a detrimental impact on economic 
performance in certain circumstances. For example, if a 
country has weak institutions and high levels of corrup-
tion, it might be difficult to envisage such a country having 
the capacity to govern effectively at local level – though, 
on the other hand, it may be possible for local government 
in some areas to bypass the problems caused by weak 
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institutions in the country as a whole. In the UK in the 
1970s and 1980s, an extremely narrow tax base might well 
have contributed to the poor performance of local govern-
ment in some areas. Also, we might expect small countries 
to benefit less from fiscal decentralisation, given that the 
optimal scale on which public goods can be provided might 
then be closer to the population of the country as a whole.
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011) suggest that fiscal 
decentralisation has had a negative impact on growth 
across 21 OECD countries. However, while the results of 
this research should lead us to question whether fiscal de-
centralisation is always and everywhere a good thing, two 
shortcomings make it less relevant to the UK case. Firstly, 
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra examine the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on growth and not on national income 
levels. It is unclear why decentralisation would necessarily 
affect growth – changes in decentralisation might lead to 
changes in national income (and therefore growth in the 
short term) but decentralisation itself is likely to lead to 
a higher level of income rather than a higher growth path. 
Secondly, they did not adjust for country size (because 
country size was strongly correlated with the level of fiscal 
decentralisation).
The benefits of reform in the UK
In a sense, the more nuanced results should lead us to be 
even more emphatic about the conclusions for the UK. The 
UK is in the worst position possible. It has very low levels 
of fiscal decentralisation, and tax raising is much more 
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centralised than spending. Overall, the evidence suggests 
that it would not be possible to devise a more damaging 
combination. Secondly, the UK is a large country in which 
it would be expected to efficiently provide public goods at a 
sub-national level. Thirdly, migration within the UK is sub-
stantial but migration from the UK to other countries is 
difficult because of either language difficulties (in the case 
of EU countries) or immigration restrictions (in the case 
of English-speaking countries). As such, starting from the 
current position, with relatively high levels of local spend-
ing financed by grants, devolving revenue raising to the 
local level should lead to much better outcomes
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4 INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
THE EXAMPLE OF SPAIN
It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a comprehensive 
set of case studies from overseas. The general empirical evi-
dence has already been examined. However, any empirical 
study using aggregate data can hide very specific features 
that can determine the success (or otherwise) of fiscal de-
centralisation. In this section, we consider the case of Spain, 
which would appear to demonstrate that fiscal decentrali-
sation needs to be handled carefully if it is to be successful.
Spain has had increasing levels of devolution to region-
al governments (comunidades autónomas or ‘autonomous 
communities’ – ACs) since 1978.
Progressive devolution with asymmetries
For much of the last two centuries, Spain was a heavily cen-
tralised country. There were brief yet repeated attempts 
at decentralisation throughout this period, one of which 
started during the Second Republic from 1931, but was cut 
short by the Civil War of 1936–39 and then decisively re-
versed by the Franco dictatorship, which lasted until 1975 
(Heywood 2000).
INTERNATIONAL 
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As part of the constitutional process during Spain’s 
transition to democracy from the mid-1970s, the consti-
tution’s framers sought to accommodate the demands for 
greater autonomy by nationalist sectors in a number of re-
gions. The rationale was that, since these regions – which 
included the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia – had 
a history of self-government and salient independent iden-
tities, they should be granted autonomy over the manage-
ment of a large number of regional affairs (Ruiz Almendral 
2012). This had to be achieved while retaining the equal 
treatment of all Spanish citizens.
The solution offered has become known as Spain’s 
‘State of the Autonomies’ (Estado de las Autonomías). At 
the heart of the system was a process of asymmetric de-
centralisation of powers to the ACs. Such asymmetry took 
two forms. Firstly, it transferred competencies to different 
regions at different paces between 1979 and 2002, when 
the process was completed.1 Secondly, it gave two ACs, the 
Basque Country and Navarre, special tax-raising powers 
in recognition of their historical rights guaranteed by 
royal charters ( fueros) over the centuries (Fernández 
 Llera 2009). All other fifteen ACs were granted much more 
limited revenue-raising powers.
Progressive devolution of spending over the last four 
decades has radically transformed the structure of public 
administration in Spain. As Table 4 illustrates, between 
1982 and 2008 the share of total public spending disbursed 
1 Power transfers in each AC followed one of three routes prescribed in the 
1978 Spanish Constitution. Heywood (2000) explains the process in greater 
detail.
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by ACs grew tenfold, while central government’s share 
dropped from 85 per cent to just over half the total.
The growth in ACs’ share of public spending reflects 
the gradual transfer of responsibility from the central gov-
ernment to the ACs for the management of a large array of 
government programmes, notably healthcare, education, 
employment and environmental policy. In many of these 
areas, the national government has retained prerogatives 
to set the general framework of policy, while ACs are tasked 
with implementation (Heywood 2000). At the same time, 
the central government maintains full control over areas 
seen as being of national importance, including not just 
defence and foreign relations but also taxation collection, 
public works and road and train networks involving more 
than one AC, as well as some large ports and airports.
While spending has been substantially decentralised 
since 1978, revenue-raising responsibilities have not been 
decentralised to the same degree. As Table 5 shows, ACs’ 
share of tax revenue has lagged behind by as much as 
13  percentage points compared with their share of total 
Table 4 Local, regional and national government spending as a 
percentage of total Spanish public expenditure 
1982 1995 2008 2013
Local government 10.6 11.1 13.3 10.8
Autonomous  Communities (ACs) 03.6 21.5 36.5 31.6
Central government (incl. Social Security) 85.5 67.3 50.2 57.6
Source: Cuenca (2009); Intervención General de la Administración del Estado; OECD Fiscal 
Decentralisation Database (2015). Figures are approximate and may not add up to 100 
per cent.
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government spending. Even this overstates AC’s tax autono-
my, since much of their revenue comes from so-called ceded 
taxes – such as a share of personal income tax and VAT, as 
well as inheritance and gift tax, wealth tax, gambling taxes 
and other taxes – which are, to a large extent, determined 
by the central government.2 ACs have some limited control 
over rate setting and deductions, but they have to follow the 
general framework set by the national government.
Ignoring the issue of ceded taxes, however, it is worth 
noting that Spain is much more decentralised than the UK, 
both from the revenue point of view and from the point of 
view of the amount of spending controlled by sub-central 
government.
Nevertheless, despite enjoying significant powers over 
the allocation and management of public spending, ACs 
are heavily dependent on the central government to fi-
nance their outlays (Ruiz Almendral 2002, 2004). Their 
main sources of income are thus revenue from the ceded 
2 This has led some scholars (Ruiz Almendral 2002; Heywood 2000) to view 
ceded taxes more as central government transfers than own sources of AC 
tax revenue.
Table 5 Local, regional and national tax revenue as a 
percentage of total tax revenue in Spain
1982 1995 2008 2013
Local government 07.5 08.5 09.6 10.1
Autonomous Communities (ACs) 01.5 04.8 23.8 25.4
Central government (incl. Social Security) 91.0 86.7 68.4 64.6
Source: OECD Fiscal Decentralisation Database (2015).  Figures are approximate and may 
not add up to 100 per cent.
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taxes, as well as conditional and unconditional transfers 
from the national government.3 Transfers are determined 
through a complex formula (see de la Fuente 2012) taking 
into account expected and real tax revenue from the AC in 
question, which is then adjusted for factors that may war-
rant additional funding (e.g. regional languages, low den-
sity and scattered populations). The final figure for each 
region is arrived at through regular political negotiations 
between AC governments and the central government on 
a bilateral and multilateral basis.
The details of the system are beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but it becomes clear that there is an acute imbal-
ance between ACs’ tax and spending powers. Successive 
reforms were passed in 1997, 2002 and 2009 to try to close 
the gap (de la Fuente 2012), and while some progress has 
been made the tax autonomy of regional governments re-
mains limited.
Problems with Spain’s devolution settlement
The most salient problem with Spain’s current system of 
devolution is that it lacks incentives for ACs to manage 
their affairs efficiently. As Ruiz  Almendral (2004) has 
pointed out, the status quo enables regional governments 
to make spending decisions without having to account for 
the required tax revenue, and without having to explain to 
voters why such spending is necessary and worth the cost. 
3 There has been a third major source of income for some ACs in the form of 
EU structural funds since Spain joined the European Community in 1986.
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What is more, to the extent that increased expenditures 
can be used as an argument for additional central govern-
ment transfers in budget negotiations, regional politicians 
are encouraged to live above their means. In addition, a 
bargaining process with central government has replaced 
representation of the local electorate as the main way in 
which resources are allocated – somewhat similar to the 
situation with the devolved nations within the UK.
These incentives appear to have borne the fruit that 
would be expected. Even in the boom years that preceded 
the 2008 crash, when the central government was posting 
budget surpluses of up to 2 per cent of GDP, the ACs had 
difficulty managing their books (Cuenca 2009). While 
there was strong variation across regions, most AC govern-
ments – with the notable exception of the Basque Country 
and Navarre, which operate under a more balanced and 
decentralised regime – recorded small deficits. Many ad-
ministrations spent lavishly on items of questionable value, 
such as regional public broadcasters, remote airports 
and myriad cultural facilities (The Economist 2008). It is 
telling that AC government-owned enterprises saw their 
debts grow more than fourfold between 1995 and 2007, 
compared with 50 per cent for all state-owned enterprises 
(Fernández Llera 2009).
The economic crisis that gripped Spain between 2008 
and 2013 further highlighted the deficiencies of the system. 
AC budget deficits soared across the board, reaching levels 
of up to 6 per cent (Cuenca 2009). Given the acuteness of the 
downturn, the rapid rise in regional government budget 
shortfalls cannot solely be blamed on a poor devolution 
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settlement, but it was arguably made worse by it. More 
importantly, the ACs’ lack of own resources to meet their 
spending commitments pushed the government to take 
increasing responsibility over the design and management 
of regional budgets. In a process akin to developments tak-
ing place in the euro zone around the same time, central 
authorities attempted to set strict deficit and debt tar-
gets for ACs to follow, with limited success ( Cuenca 2009; 
Ruiz Almendral and Cuenca 2014). This undermined a fun-
damental principle underlying the devolved constitutional 
settlement in Spain, namely that regional governments 
enjoy autonomy over the management of their financial af-
fairs. It also decisively hurt the credibility of the no-bailout 
principle (which had never been explicitly acknowledged), 
raising concerns about moral hazard and the probability 
that the ACs would expect central government assistance 
in future budget crises.
Lessons for the UK
Prior to the crisis, the devolution settlement in Spain was 
widely viewed as broadly successful, if still a work in pro-
gress (Heywood 2000; Ruiz Almendral 2002). The 2008 
downturn exposed the severe weaknesses in the system, 
which stemmed largely from a persistent lack of reve-
nue-raising responsibilities to match the ACs’ spending 
powers together with no effective mechanisms to ensure 
fiscal responsibility. Reforms aimed at increasing regional 
governments’ tax autonomy addressed the imbalance only 
mildly, and they failed to introduce adequate incentives 
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for ACs to take responsibility over their spending com-
mitments. This not only undermined the principles under-
lying devolution, but also compromised the soundness of 
Spain’s public finances at all levels of government.
The experience of the crisis together with renewed 
pressures for self-government in Catalonia and (to a lesser 
degree) the Basque Country pushed policymakers to rec-
ognise the need for substantial reform by way of genuine 
fiscal decentralisation. This could follow the model of the 
Basque Country and Navarre, which, due to their foral 
status, have responsibility for raising the vast majority 
of taxes, including personal income tax, corporation tax 
and VAT. In turn, they transfer a small amount (cupo) to 
the central government to pay for nationally provided ser-
vices.4 This means that they are self-reliant for over 90 per 
cent of their expenditures and receive less than 3 per cent 
of their resources from the central government (Ruiz  Al-
mendral 2004). Extending the arrangements in these two 
ACs to all other regions would turn Spain into a genuinely 
federal country, more akin to Germany or Canada.
The Spanish experience offers three key lessons for any 
future process of devolution in the UK.
Firstly, any arrangement that does not couple the 
transfer of spending responsibilities with a concomitant 
decentralisation of tax-raising powers will make the 
system fragile and undermine governance. The UK has 
4 There has been some controversy over the specific amount to be trans-
ferred to the national government, with some observers claiming it is too 
low compared with the services provided in exchange. Nevertheless, it is 
the arrangement itself rather than the figures that matter for our analysis.
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already made that mistake and it led to fragility and in-
stability. The decentralisation of tax raising powers should 
also be explicit, as, for example, in Canada. This ensures 
that the important relationships are between the elected 
representatives and the people rather than the elected rep-
resentatives and the federal government.
Secondly, there must be an explicit no-bailout principle 
that is stated from the outset. This would apply to both 
national governments within the UK (such as Scotland) 
and local government. Only in this way can accountability 
and fiscal responsibility be ensured. Canada has a very 
clear no-bailout tradition and provinces have in the past 
been allowed to default and take the consequences.5 This 
alone does not necessarily stop a sub-federal entity build-
ing up debt,6 but it should help, especially when combined 
with constitutional restrictions on borrowing, and it also 
makes clear where fiscal responsibility lies.
Thirdly, the settlement should be symmetrical: regions, 
nations or local authorities should not have different de-
grees of decentralised powers while at the same time hav-
ing the same representation in parliament.
5 http://www.conferenceboard.ca/economics/hot_eco_topics/default/ 
11-11-30/provincial_debt_is_not_a_federal_responsibility.aspx
6 See Speer (2014) for a discussion of Quebec’s debt position.
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5 DEALING WITH THE ENGLISH QUESTION: 
HALF-BAKED SOLUTIONS
As has already been noted, the problems posed by devolu-
tion are not new to the UK. Precisely the problems described 
above existed in relation to Northern Ireland until direct 
rule was established in 1972 and they were anticipated in the 
discussions surrounding home rule for Ireland in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see Bowers 2012). 
For example, when home rule for Ireland was discussed, 
proposals included the exclusion of Irish members from the 
House of Commons, reducing the number of Irish members 
or preventing them from voting on issues that were decided 
in Ireland (the equivalent to English votes for English laws, 
which is being discussed in parliament at the time of writ-
ing). Rather later, when, in the event, Northern Ireland was 
given devolved powers, the number of Northern Irish MPs 
was reduced. Translated into the current conjuncture, how-
ever, none of these solutions is satisfactory.
English votes for English laws (EVEL)
If members of parliament in the nations with devolved gov-
ernment were excluded from the UK parliament altogether 
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– as was suggested in the case of Irish home rule – it would 
mean that they could not vote on matters to do with the 
taxes that would be raised in their constituencies to pay 
for UK-wide or devolved spending. It would also mean 
that they could not vote on matters pertaining to the UK 
as a whole. This is clearly unsatisfactory and is not under 
serious consideration. An alternative to this approach 
would be to exclude non-English members of parliament 
from votes relating to measures that only affect England. 
However, there are several problems with this proposal, 
which has become known as ‘English votes for English laws’ 
(EVEL).
EVEL would, in effect, mean that in some circum-
stances, depending on the outcome of a general election, a 
stable government could not be formed that could propose 
legislation on and administer departments in relation to 
all issues. For example, there could be a Labour govern-
ment in the UK as a whole, dealing with matters such as 
foreign affairs and proposing budgets. At the same time, 
that government might not be able to legislate in England 
on areas related to health and education, on which Scot-
tish members would have no vote.
Packer and Sinclair (2015) also point out that this so-
called EVEL proposal would weaken accountability. It 
would mean that some MPs were responsible for two sets 
of issues and others only one. It would be very difficult 
to identify the executive that was responsible for English 
issues. If there were dissatisfaction with the health ser-
vice, for example, would that be the fault of the relevant 
ministry, the organisation of the service in England or the 
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financing of the service through the Treasury? The whole 
system would be very confusing.
This problem could be avoided by creating an entirely 
separate English parliament, but this would create yet 
another level of government (also see Packer and Sinclair, 
2015). Some English electors are already represented at 
parish or town, district, county, UK and EU level and this 
proposal would create a sixth level of representation.1
Reducing the number of non-English members 
of parliament
Reducing the number of non-English members of parlia-
ment would help dilute the problem of non-English mem-
bers being able to vote on matters that do not affect their 
constituents, but would not solve it.2 Furthermore, this 
would create other anomalies. If this policy were followed, 
non-English members would be under-represented on 
those matters that pertained to the whole of the UK (for 
example, defence and foreign policy) while still being able 
to vote on issues that did not affect their constituents, such 
as health and education, albeit in smaller numbers.
1 Though the federal system proposed below would also have an additional 
level of representation, the delineation of powers would be very clear and 
the powers of the federal parliament very limited.
2 Harold Wilson expressed concern about the potentially decisive votes of 
the Ulster Unionist Party in the 1964 parliament when they were voting on 
issues that had been devolved to Northern Ireland. In that case there were 
only a handful of Northern Ireland members who could have swayed the 
result of a vote.
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Devolution within England
A further possibility would be to devolve more power to 
local government in England. This is proposed by Packer 
and Sinclair (2015). Their proposal is not so much half-
baked as an incomplete solution that needs to be comple-
mented by other measures. A different approach that in-
volves moving to regional government, on the other hand, 
would bring with it a number of problems.
Decentralisation to local government
Decentralisation as proposed by Packer and Sinclair would 
be welcome. Indeed, it is proposed below, together with a 
new settlement for the nations within the UK. In theory, 
if everything that is being devolved in Scotland were also 
devolved to English local authority areas, then this would 
resolve the West Lothian question and the other problems 
with the current settlement that are discussed above. How-
ever, following this approach without complementary re-
forms throws up some major problems. Firstly, the median 
population of the main local government areas in England 
is around 250,000. Packer and Sinclair rightly say that this 
is no smaller than similar local government units in other 
countries that have much more decentralised systems. 
Nevertheless, the amount of devolution to Scotland (and 
arguably Northern Ireland and Wales) would then be con-
strained by the amount of feasible decentralisation to local 
government. Secondly, Scotland has its own traditions and 
cultures, which may make it appropriate to devolve more 
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aspects of economic and political decision-making to 
that nation. Limiting the extent of devolution to Scotland 
would prevent the beneficial competition between and 
experimentation within Scotland and England on the very 
broad range of issues that could come under each nation’s 
government.
Devolution to the regions
A different approach to devolution within England would 
involve giving powers to the regions. This issue was raised 
by the dissenters to the Royal Commission on the Consti-
tution published in 1973.3 They believed that it was wrong 
to give devolved powers to Scotland and Wales without a 
symmetrical devolution settlement to ensure that Scottish 
and Welsh members of the UK parliament were not voting 
on issues that only affected England – in other words, they 
articulated exactly the same concerns as those discussed 
above. Their proposal was to create English regions with 
similar powers to those of any Scottish and Welsh govern-
ment that might be created.
Such proposals have a certain logic to them. When 
devolution was implemented in 1999, the government 
attempted to create regional assemblies in England to 
complement the Scottish parliament and Welsh assem-
bly. However, there are a number of problems with this 
approach. Firstly, there is little enthusiasm for it within 
3 The dissenters were Professor Alan Peacock and Lord Crowther-Hunt; the 
report is known as the Kilbrandon Report.
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England. Only 11 per cent of the North East’s electorate 
voted in favour of an elected regional assembly in a referen-
dum held in 2004 – and this region was regarded as being 
the one most likely to be enthusiastic about a regional 
assembly. Secondly, unless regions took over all the func-
tions of the proposed RUK (or English, Welsh and Northern 
Irish) parliaments, there would be an extra layer of govern-
ment needed. Thirdly, there is no distinct legal system or 
any other feature of English regions, which would seem 
to point in the direction of autonomy. Regions also do not 
even have established boundaries. Furthermore, a region-
al devolution settlement would make it much harder to re-
sist the pull to the centre that arises in federal systems. For 
example, a federal country of around ten regional entities 
could less easily operate on the principle of unanimity.
Overall, a regional devolution settlement that was radi-
cal enough to deal with the English question would essen-
tially be constructivist – that is, it would involve the entire 
remodelling of the British constitution around a unit of 
government that was arbitrary from both the political and 
the geographical points of view. Certainly, it could be ar-
gued that current local authority areas should be merged, 
broken up or changed because their creation in the past 
was also arbitrary, but that is an entirely different argu-
ment. The federalist and localist solutions proposed below, 
on the other hand, involve a natural evolution of current 
arrangements together with a return of powers to entities 
from which they have been centralised in the first place.
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6 A FEDERAL SOLUTION TO 
THE ENGLISH PROBLEM
The most appropriate system of governance for the UK is 
an entirely federal solution. It has none of the faults of the 
other proposals and many advantages.
In order to implement this proposal there would have 
to be a parliamentary act proposing that referenda should 
be held in Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The referenda could pose alternatives such as the status 
quo or full independence for Scotland and the other na-
tions. However, the main proposal would be for a federal 
system to be created. Within that federal system, Wales 
and Northern Ireland would have to decide whether they 
should be independent nations in the same way as Scot-
land or join England while having a degree of devolution.
For ease of exposition, we propose that the basic gov-
ernmental units should become Scotland and the Rest of 
the UK (RUK).
Functions of the federal government
Although an indication of the powers that would be held 
at federal and national levels would have to be given at 
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the time of the referenda, there would be an opportunity 
to change these by unanimous agreement at a later time. 
Ideally, the federal functions would be limited to:
• defence
• border control (and, by implication, migration and the 
consequential potential financial costs in relation to 
the financing of asylum seekers and refugees1)
• foreign affairs (including issues related to EU 
membership and, hence, trade)
• the management of the existing national debt
• possibly, monetary affairs and banking regulation, 
assuming that both countries wished to keep a central 
bank2
It is assumed that all UK nations would share the 
same head of state. Policy related to offshore and onshore 
national resources would be a function of the national 
governments (Scotland and RUK) rather than the federal 
government, though there are proposals below to further 
localise the regulation of onshore natural resources (such 
as fracked natural gas).
What is the rationale for these powers being maintained 
by the federal government? Ricketts (2004) discusses the 
1 As it happens, there might be considerable benefits in completely decou-
pling the financial costs of looking after asylum seekers and refugees from 
the welfare system designed for people who are permanently resident.
2 This would be an opportunity to try alternative monetary arrangements 
such as proposed by Hayek (1990). Such arrangements served Scotland well 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
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competencies of the EU and notes how far they have deviated 
from those which economic analysis would suggest that the 
EU should have. For example, EU-wide public goods such as 
defence are not provided at the EU level, while many func-
tions of the EU, such as the management of fisheries, could be 
more efficiently provided by nation states or by markets. If we 
believe that one of the most important functions of govern-
ment is the provision of public goods that cannot necessarily 
be provided by the market,3 then it is reasonable to provide 
at federal level those public goods for which there are likely 
to be considerable scale economies at the federal level or for 
which there are significant externalities or spillovers if the 
services were provided at nation state or local level.
Of course, without a market for such services and a 
process of competitive discovery (see Kirzner 1992), it is 
impossible to know on what scale public goods should be 
provided. Nevertheless, judgements do have to be made 
about how to distribute powers in a federal system. On 
balance, it would not seem unreasonable that, in the case 
of an island,4 defence, border control and foreign affairs 
would be best managed at the federal level. It would also 
seem logical to manage the historically accumulated na-
tional debt at federal level given that it was accumulated 
under a unitary UK government.
3 This paper discusses the reform of the UK constitution and it is not our 
intention to discuss at length whether many so-called public goods are, in 
fact, club goods that could be provided by the market. Whichever layer of 
government is responsible for a particular area of policy could, if it wished, 
open up provision to the market or to civil society groups.
4 Though, of course, Northern Ireland is not part of mainland Britain.
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Should environmental problems be handled at 
the federal level?
There will, of course, be other issues that it might be sen-
sible to deal with at the federal level. These may include 
environmental problems that involve cross-border exter-
nalities or dealing with the breakout of communicable 
diseases in farm animals. The functions to be performed 
at federal level can be changed using the processes out-
lined. However, it should not be thought that all areas of 
policy that involve these kinds of externalities need to be 
handled at the federal level. To begin with, the EU has a 
very significant role here.5 Under the Lisbon Treaty, the 
environment is a joint EU/member state competence 
and there are few major environmental issues where EU 
policy would not drive policy in the UK. For example, the 
foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2001 was handled 
administratively by the relevant UK government depart-
ment, but policy discretion was severely limited by EU 
directives.
Where there are cross-border environmental issues 
that are not under the influence of EU policy, intergov-
ernmental cooperation within the federation may well be 
the most appropriate solution. (This is the approach, for 
example, that is taken with regard to the Rhine, which 
flows through several countries and is protected by the 
Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, which is 
5 No judgement is made in this paper about whether these roles are correctly 
defined.
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signed by the EU and five Rhine-bordering countries.) 
However, there may still be a potentially very small num-
ber of issues that are not under the authority of the EU 
and where cooperation between the nations within a 
federal UK might not be feasible because just one of the 
UK nations is imposing costs upon another and has no 
incentive to cooperate. This is, though, no different from 
the position that pertains in relation to any other set of 
EU countries that share land borders, including the UK 
and the Republic of Ireland.
Monetary affairs and banking regulation
Monetary policy is also complex. Debates over monetary 
affairs were at the heart of the recent Scottish independ-
ence referendum. Monetary policy could be handled in 
many ways: Scotland and RUK could have separate cen-
tral banks; the current arrangement could be maintained 
and be the responsibility of the federal government; the 
central bank could be maintained in England but with 
Scotland establishing a currency board; or either con-
stituent nation could choose to abolish central banks 
altogether.
The author’s preference is for one of the latter two solu-
tions (preferably the last). However, if central banks are 
maintained, it is important for banking regulation to be 
undertaken on a consistent basis with central banking 
functions. If central banking is a federal responsibility, 
then banking regulation should be also.
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One argument in favour of keeping central banking 
as a federal responsibility is that the banking systems 
of Scotland and RUK are so closely integrated, and will 
remain so as long as the UK remains part of the EU, that 
establishing separate central banking and monetary sys-
tems would be costly. A second argument is that the UK is 
likely to be potentially much closer to an optimal currency 
area than euro zone countries are, and that the sharing of 
a currency reduces transactions costs. Against this, some 
would maintain that, given that it is being proposed that 
the federal government has no competency in the field of 
redistribution or other fiscal transfers, Scotland and RUK 
might be less resilient in the face of specific shocks that af-
fect one part of the federation. Such an argument has been 
made by those who believe that European monetary union 
should go hand in hand with greater fiscal responsibilities 
for the EU layer of government.6
On balance, the author proposes keeping monetary 
affairs and banking regulation as a federal responsibility, 
but this would be one of the areas that might generate 
greatest debate and subsequent reform. The onus would be 
on the Scottish and RUK governments to ensure that their 
economies were sufficiently deregulated at the microeco-
nomic level so that macroeconomic shocks would not have 
sustainable impacts on employment.7
6 For example, this was recently proposed by the French president, François 
Hollande (http://openeurope.org.uk/blog/hollande-proposes-a-eurozone 
-government/) and is widely discussed by economists.
7 Again, this has been widely discussed in the case of the euro. See, for example, 
http://www.cer.org.uk/in-the-press/euros-success-requires-liberalisation
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Functions of national (Scottish and RUK) 
governments
All other major government functions would be the ulti-
mate responsibility of the national governments within 
the UK (assumed to be Scotland and RUK). This does not 
mean that such functions should be centralised within 
and controlled by national governments. On the one hand, 
action will be circumscribed by international treaties: UK 
membership of the EU and the World Trade Organization, 
for example, would prevent the Scottish or RUK govern-
ments from imposing trade barriers. On the other hand, 
there should be significant decentralisation of government 
functions as discussed below. However, in areas such as 
policing, health, education, policy in relation to natural 
resources (both offshore and onshore), welfare and pen-
sions, criminal, civil and commercial law, the provision 
of foreign aid, arts policy, the environment and land-use 
planning, there would be no federal responsibility – simply 
intergovernmental cooperation if that were desired. Gov-
ernment intervention could then only take place if desired 
by the Scottish or RUK governments within their own 
jurisdictions.
A further function that would generally be handled by 
the Scottish and RUK governments acting separately would 
be legal issues relating to personal freedoms and, where ap-
propriate, human rights. This is an area of some difficulty as 
the UK does not have a written constitution. Fundamental 
rights are currently protected through a range of mech-
anisms (international treaties, statute law, common law 
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and so on). International obligations (such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights) would remain and therefore 
be in force throughout the whole of the UK. There may be 
some issues which, as a result of other competences being 
exercised at the federal level, might be handled by the fed-
eral government. These could include the treatment and fi-
nance of provision for asylum seekers, for example. However, 
issues such as abortion, hunting, laws relating to marriage 
and to euthanasia should be competences for Scotland and 
RUK separately. Scotland already has its own legal system 
and competence over some of these matters and, indeed, 
even Northern Ireland has separate legislation in relation 
to abortion. Dealing with such matters at the lower level of 
government rather than at the federal level allows laws to 
take account of the preferences and cultures of the nations 
concerned while also allowing foot voting by those who 
might prefer alternative policies.
Synchronising economics and politics
It might be argued that there are wider political consider-
ations that should be taken into account when assigning 
functions to different levels of government. Indeed, Bas table, 
writing on public finance from an economic point of view 
back in 1895, pointed out that the structure of government 
is often determined by historical evolution. It is not the pur-
pose of this economic analysis to engage with that debate 
directly. However, it is worth noting that for most of the 
period for which the Union has existed (1707 until at least 
1914) government was limited in its functions to defence, 
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foreign affairs, the regulation of trade (which has effectively 
become an EU function), monetary policy (for part of the 
period) and the management of the national debt. Govern-
ments in the UK did little else. As such, distinct Scottish 
and English (and sometimes Northern Irish and Welsh) 
traditions developed in areas such as education, law and 
criminal justice and the provision of social insurances. Pro-
gressively, policy was centralised under the UK government, 
but that period of centralisation was relatively brief and be-
gan to reverse in 1999. Sometimes these different traditions 
have been based on distinct policies being followed in the 
different nations within the UK, and sometimes through 
the development of independent welfare institutions within 
the various countries of the UK. The important point is that 
there is a significant similarity between the functions pro-
posed for the federal government and those for which the 
UK government was responsible from 1707 to 1914. Those 
functions that it is proposed are removed from the domain 
of the federal UK government have only been functions of a 
centralised British state for a short period of time. Thus, the 
economic analysis of the functions that should be handled 
centrally by a federal government would seem to run with 
the grain of history.
Federal, UK and Scottish parliaments
Both a Scottish parliament and an RUK parliament would 
be established to deal with matters that were not UK-wide. 
In addition, there would be a UK parliament that could 
be small and meet infrequently except during times of 
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national emergency. It is not the purpose of this paper to 
discuss exactly how the parliaments would be elected, but 
there would be a stronger case for fixed terms and a much 
smaller number of members in the UK-wide parliament. It 
would also not be unreasonable for the smaller nations to 
be over-represented compared with their populations in 
the federal parliament. For illustration, a possible set of ar-
rangements for the various parliaments is shown in Box 1.
Preventing re-centralisation of power
A proper federal solution should put the power in the hands 
of Scotland and RUK to devolve power upwards to the 
federal union, rather than the authority for determining 
Box 1 Possible political arrangements for a federal UK
 Federal parliament
• Maximum term – five years.
• One hundred members of the federal parliament, 
determined in the following way: five for Northern 
Ireland; five for Wales; ten for Scotland; twenty for 
England; the rest determined by population.
• All members of parliament to be elected by 
first-past-the-post or alternative vote with roughly 
equal constituency populations within each home 
nation.
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• Second chamber with forty members elected for 
a maximum of one ten-year term with strictly no 
institutional party campaign finance or backing, 
and ten hereditary members elected by the current 
hereditary peers. The sole function of this chamber 
would be to be propose amendments to or return 
for reconsideration legislation of the first chamber.
• Five government departments.
• No more than fifteen government ministers, 
limited by statute.
• Ministers could be drawn from either house of 
parliament.
• Members of both chambers would sit for one week 
per month during ten months of the year.
 RUK parliament
• Maximum term – five years.
• Four hundred members of parliament in 
constituencies of roughly equal population to be 
elected by first-past-the-post or alternative vote.
• Five government departments plus a Department 
of Federal Affairs to deal with the interface 
between federal and national issues.
• Maximum of twenty ministers limited by statute.
• Ministers could be drawn from outside parliament.
• Members of parliament, but not ministers, would 
be part-time – roughly 30 hours a week.
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which powers lie where being held at the federal level. 
Many federal unions or international bodies made up of 
nation states have seen a centralisation of power at the 
federal or supranational level. This has happened within 
the EU and also within the US. Both Bolick (1994) and 
Vaubel (2009) argue that institutional design is the key to 
preventing centralisation.
In any system that works on the basis of majorities and 
has federal institutions that favour centralisation, there 
tends to be an accretion of powers to the centre; once they 
lie with the centre, these powers are difficult to return to 
the federal units (or member states in the case of the EU). 
Constitutional protections are often not effective if the 
constitutional court is at the federal/supranational level 
because, where issues require interpretation, which is nor-
mally the case, the constitutional court tends to favour au-
thority being moved to the higher level of government. The 
solution to this problem (proposed in different ways and 
in somewhat different contexts by both Bolick and Vaubel) 
is to require unanimity at the sub-federal level when deci-
sions are taken about where powers should lie.
This principle, while difficult to implement in a 50- or 
28-state union, is much easier to implement in the federal 
system proposed here. It is proposed that, for any compe-
tence to be passed upwards to the UK level, there would 
have to be agreement in each of the Scottish, RUK and UK 
parliaments. There would also have to be agreement from 
the Scottish, RUK and federal parliaments for powers to 
be passed down from the UK level. Unanimity – which 
is essential in any federal system to prevent the drift to 
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centralisation – would be realistic and practical in the UK 
context.
Centralisation also tends to arise where there are am-
biguous clauses in constitutions which are interpreted in 
a centralising way by federal institutions that hold the ul-
timate power. Bolick cites the interstate commerce clause 
in the US constitution as being important in promoting 
centralisation. And the same can be argued in relation 
to the development of the EU single market; this evolved 
from the promotion of trade based on mutual recognition 
of national regulations to the harmonisation of regulation 
at EU level (see Booth and Morrison 2012). The fundamen-
tal problem is that, once the federal level is given power to 
regulate trade (to prevent trade barriers developing within 
the country), almost any form of regulation at the central 
level can be justified because of its relevance to promoting 
trade.
There is no straightforward solution to this problem. 
However, as long as the UK remains part of the EU, nearly 
all such trade-related issues will be handled at the EU level, 
and thus the problem might be relatively limited in prac-
tice. Indeed, unless the UK leaves the EU, it would not be 
necessary for powers in relation to trade regulation to be 
delineated at all.
There are various other details that would need to be 
worked out and which are not discussed further here. 
For example, there would inevitably be some areas over 
which the federal and national governments might claim 
sovereignty (or a legitimate interest), e.g. a major public 
or animal health crisis close to borders. Would it be the 
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federal government or the national governments that 
would determine whether or not animal movements had 
to cease? The small number of nations involved should 
make conflict less problematic, but there would need to 
be a constitutional court that would determine whether 
an issue was a matter for the individual nations or a fed-
eral matter, and whether a matter would require dual 
authority, so that a lower-level parliament could veto the 
federal government.
Ensuring no bailouts
A second problem with federal systems is the treatment of 
government borrowing at the sub-federal level. This must 
be dealt with very clearly ex ante and the following princi-
ples would be sustainable and provide the right incentives 
for sound fiscal management:
• The existing UK-wide debt would remain and be 
managed by the UK government. Taxes would 
be levied to service this and/or pay it down as 
appropriate.
• The UK-wide government could increase its debt 
level from that inherited at the outset of the federal 
structure (measured as a proportion of national 
income) but only with the agreement of UK, Scottish 
and RUK parliaments.
• Only UK-wide debt would be acceptable for monetary 
policy operations of the central bank if the central 
bank were to operate across the UK.
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• There would be strictly no bailout of the debts of RUK 
or Scotland and all debt issued by those governments 
would be on that understanding.8
It is not the purpose of this paper to lay out in detail how 
the budgets of the constituent parts of government will 
look. However, we might expect the federal government to 
spend about £100–120 billion, the biggest portion of which 
would be on debt interest.9 The federal budget would also 
include the EU gross contribution.
The amount spent at the federal level would be roughly 
equal to the UK VAT yield or the UK national insurance 
yield or about two-thirds of the UK income tax yield. It is 
important that there are broad legal constraints on feder-
al taxation that can only be changed by agreement of the 
Scottish and RUK parliaments. The principle that should 
be followed is that taxes can be levied by the federal gov-
ernment with the following constraints:
• A value added tax can be levied at a set maximum rate 
with a broad base.
8 Unlike in the case of the euro, this provision would be enforceable because 
the central bank would not be taking Scottish or RUK debt in monetary op-
erations and therefore becoming liable for default through the back door.
9 Interestingly, this takes us very close to the position in 1870 when UK gov-
ernment spending was 10 per cent of national income, about half of which 
was debt interest. Indeed, a key reason for a federal approach is that it 
recognises that, when the welfare state was developed, it could have been 
developed independently for Scotland and the rest of the UK. Broadly, as 
already noted, the proposed federal government will undertake those 
functions that governments undertook for most of the period of the Union 
(from 1714 to the development of the welfare state in 1911).
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• A land value tax or tax on imputed rent can be levied, 
the maximum rate of which is linked to the lower of 
the basic rates of income tax levied in Scotland and 
RUK (e.g. a land value tax of one-twentieth of the 
lowest basic rate of income tax).
• Any property tax that is levied applies equally to 
business and domestic property.
It is preferable not to levy a federal income tax given the 
link between income tax and the corporation tax system 
that would be administered separately in the two coun-
tries, but a federal income tax should not be ruled out on 
principle.
Objections to a federal solution
Gough and Tyrie (2015) object to a federal solution. They 
describe it as an ‘attractive, tidy and apparently logical’ 
solution but argue that it could not be implemented quick-
ly. Further, they suggest that the size of England (or RUK 
as proposed here) would make the UK an unequal federal 
partnership for which there is no precedent. The main ob-
jection appears to be that the federal government would 
be a weak and marginal player in domestic affairs and that 
the solution would not hold.
These are not compelling objections. The whole pur-
pose of the proposed federal arrangement is to ensure 
that the UK government does become a marginal player in 
domestic affairs. This would enable foot voting, competi-
tion and a better matching of the provision of public goods 
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and regulation to the views and preferences of the citizens 
of the nations involved. There is some merit in the point 
regarding the issue of the size of RUK or England relative 
to Scotland. However, this differential exists in the case 
of Westminster representation currently – it is simply a 
matter of population and geography. With regard to issues 
such as defence and foreign affairs, which are currently 
issues for the Westminster parliament and will become 
the responsibility of a federal parliament, Scotland cur-
rently holds fewer than 10 per cent of all the votes. Exactly 
how representation should be determined in the proposed 
federal parliament is a practical problem beyond the scope 
of this paper but, no doubt, Scottish representation would 
be around 10 per cent of the total or perhaps higher.
The main political advantage of a federal solution is the 
stability that comes from government by consent com-
bined with an alignment between taxation, representation 
and decision-making. The fact that there will be between 
two and four countries within the federal arrangement 
should make decision-making under unanimity relatively 
easy, thus aiding the stability of the arrangements further.
There have been other criticisms of federal government. 
For example, some studies have suggested that unitary 
governments can perform better than federal govern-
ments. However, this may be because in some federal sys-
tems accountability is not clear. The proposals made here 
involve much clearer accountability and delineation of re-
sponsibilities than exist under the current unitary system 
of government or under any feasible unitary system that 
could exist in the future given the desire to decentralise 
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more authority to Scotland, and possibly other areas of the 
UK. It is also possible that federal systems originate from 
internal conflict (including armed conflict) within a coun-
try and that the internal conflict is the underlying source 
of lack of prosperity. It is therefore difficult to compare like 
with like when looking at the performance of federal and 
unitary systems.
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7 FURTHER FISCAL DECENTRALISATION: 
SPENDING AND REGULATORY 
RESPONSIBILITIES
The creation of a federal UK is only part of the necessary 
decentralisation agenda. Within individual nations, 
there should be further decentralisation. It would be for 
the individual nations to decide how much further to de-
centralise policy within their own jurisdictions. However, 
local government funding in Wales and Northern Ireland 
is already a devolved matter and it will be assumed that 
this remains the case. In effect, therefore, what follows 
is a discussion of the decentralisation of government in 
England, though the author believes that it would be ben-
eficial for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to follow 
a similar track.
Principle to be followed
The principle that should be followed is that there should 
be the widest possible decentralisation of both spend-
ing and fiscal responsibilities to the lowest level of gov-
ernment that is consistent with the efficient provision 
of public goods. Given that local authority areas can 
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combine to provide services, and smaller units of local 
government can contract with bigger units for the latter 
to provide services, there should be a bias in favour of 
over-decentralisation.
The principle that should be followed in essence is that 
of subsidiarity, which is an aspect of Catholic social teach-
ing much misquoted and misused in relation to the EU (see 
Chapter 1).
As already noted, the principle argues that smaller 
organisations should be allowed to do what they can 
do, not what they are most efficient at doing – this also 
implies that the benefit of the doubt should be in the dir-
ection of decentralisation. The principle of subsidiarity 
as used in the EU is quite different.1 This allows the EU 
to act in the field of regulation and other interventions 
if it believes it would be more effective than if action is 
taken by member states. In the document explaining the 
concept, it also states that action should only be taken at 
the local level if action at the local level is necessary. In 
general, the principle of subsidiarity as used in the EU is 
wide open to interpretation and the document defining it 
seems contradictory. However, the principle does have a 
very clear meaning in its original form and that should be 
the meaning adopted when it comes to the programme of 
decentralisation in the UK.
Fiscal decentralisation within England should broadly 
follow the proposals of Packer and Sinclair (2015). Sub-
stantial additional responsibilities would be passed to 
1 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TxT/?uri=uriserv:ai0017
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county councils, cities with county powers and unitary 
authorities. However, the basic unit of local government 
could – indeed should – hand down responsibility further 
to parishes, towns or district council areas.
Consider, for example, the situation of parish councils 
that currently have tiny budgets. Lindfield, a large parish 
council area in Sussex, has a budget of £200,000, which 
amounts to £33 per head of population.2 Most local au-
thority spending for Lindfield residents is undertaken at 
county council level. The relevant county, West Sussex, 
has an area of nearly 800 square miles and a population of 
nearly one million. It is implausible that nearly all goods 
and services that cannot be provided privately by individ-
uals and families and which need to be provided by some 
layer of sub-central government need to be provided on 
such a centralised and large scale by a county council.
The precise method by which there could be further 
decentralisation is not discussed here. However, there are 
three potential approaches that could be followed:
• The basic local authority unit could devolve further 
powers (with agreement) to district and parish council 
levels.
• The lower levels could be given statutory responsibilities 
and tax raising powers by central government (as 
happens now) but with these responsibilities being 
much wider than those currently held.
2 http://www.lindfieldparishcouncil.gov.uk/Core/LindfieldPC/UserFiles/
Files/FGPMins08.01.15.pdf
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• Lower levels of local authority could ask for powers to 
be granted, and this could be agreed by the Secretary 
of State.
Decentralisation in practice
Working from the above principles, the policy areas to be 
devolved to local government level should include environ-
mental policy, aspects of welfare, education and health, 
policing and certain forms of regulation. There are other 
areas of policy that should also be considered for decen-
tralisation, for example, road building, ownership and 
maintenance (see Knipping and Wellings 2012). The list 
discussed here should not be considered exhaustive.
There should also be a review of all statutory require-
ments on local authorities.3 The only ones that would be 
retained would be those necessary to prevent local author-
ities shifting burdens onto neighbouring areas and those 
that involved, for reasons of efficiency, local authorities 
executing central government functions (for example, reg-
istrar functions).
Environmental policy
Most areas of environmental policy should be dealt with 
at local level, including by local authorities combining 
together. Problems such as flood defences, whether to 
manage environmental problems or prevent them, and so 
3 In 2011 there were over 1,300 such statutory duties as discussed above.
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on, are best dealt with at the local level, where local pref-
erences about the costs and benefits in the context of dif-
ferent geographies and population densities can be taken 
into account.
Working-age welfare
Working-age welfare is a strong candidate for localisa-
tion. While it may be desirable for central government 
to provide a minimum income for those in greatest need, 
other aspects of working-age welfare should be localised. 
It has been proposed by Niemietz (2012), for example, that 
working-age benefits for those not working a full week 
should be attached to strong work requirements. Local 
authorities should manage benefits for these groups and 
administer training and work requirements. The situ-
ation and needs of the unemployed in, for example, Cam-
bridge, are very different from the situation and needs 
of the unemployed in Doncaster or Cornwall, and these 
needs could be best managed locally with financial re-
sponsibility at local level.
Such an approach has been tried in Lithuania and has 
met with considerable success in reducing the number of 
people who receive welfare and the average amount paid 
to recipients. Local authorities have an incentive to create 
the right business conditions for job creation and for the 
promotion of prosperity more generally and also to finance 
or provide the right kind of programmes for those who are 
at the margins of the labour market. Though it is difficult 
to make a judgement about the reform so soon after its 
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implementation in 2014, the performance of a pilot group 
of local authorities in which the programme was imple-
mented in 2011 does indicate success. There are also very 
strong signs of success elsewhere in the country in the first 
year of the reform.4 
Part of the Clinton reforms of welfare benefits in the US 
in 1996 involved giving greater financial responsibility to 
states. There were a large number of other changes under-
taken at the same time and so it is difficult to measure the 
success of one particular change. However, some states, 
taking the opportunity to innovate within their welfare 
systems, were extremely successful when it came to mov-
ing welfare recipients into work. The basic problem is that 
the needs of those without full-time work are very diverse. 
In some areas, there may be structural problems causing 
long-term unemployment; in other areas a large propor-
tion of the unemployed may have difficulty with language 
skills or have received a very poor education; others may 
have problems with addiction; and so on. These problems 
are more likely to be identified and resolved at local level 
with the right incentives in place for local government to 
devise effective welfare systems.
Education and health
In the case of education, there should be complementary 
reform that would promote the maximum degree of 
4 http://en.llri.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Social- Allowances-across 
-Municipalities.pdf
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autonomy for parents. However, certain residual issues such 
as ensuring special needs provision (though not necessarily 
providing it), making sure that schools that are receiving 
state-funded vouchers5 fulfil the requirements of the law, 
and so on would be a local authority function. The general fi-
nancing of education would be removed entirely from local 
authority budgets and be directed through parents. How-
ever, local authorities would have discretion, for example, to 
finance free school meals, adult education courses, special 
education and training courses for those not in employ-
ment, and provide support for higher education institutions. 
These would be entirely a matter for the local authority – as 
would be decisions as to whether to charge those outside the 
local authority area for such provision.
With regard to healthcare, again there should be com-
plementary reforms to promote much greater individual 
choice, but there might be some functions that are cur-
rently undertaken nationally that should be undertaken 
by local government. These might include public health 
functions, for example.
Natural resource exploitation
Currently, all natural resources below ground are as-
sumed to be owned by the Crown. The UK government 
gives licences to extract such resources and normally 
takes a royalty in the form of taxes. This system has several 
5 Assuming that vouchers or some similar system would be the preferred 
system of giving parental autonomy over education.
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disadvantages over the system that exists in the US and 
existed in the UK before the Petroleum Production Act 
1934. Historically, in the UK – and still today in the US – 
natural resources were owned by landowners. Landown-
ers then had an incentive to exploit resources to an extent 
that was economic, subject to meeting local planning 
rules that might try to prevent pollution, unsightly extrac-
tion works and so on. This is one reason for the success of 
the fracking industry in the US and the success of the coal 
industry in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Brit-
ain compared with the relative failure of the UK fracking 
industry in the last few years.
Central government ownership of resources immediate-
ly creates conflict. The government owns the royalty raised 
in the form of taxes from the exploitation of resources, 
but the local people suffer the cost. If the resources were 
privately owned, the owner would be able to compensate 
those affected directly in return for being given planning 
permission to extract the resources.
The localisation of extraction rights for oil and gas with-
in local councils would achieve many of the benefits of re-
turning rights to the owners of the property below which 
extraction was taking place. It would then be local residents 
who would both bear the cost and gain any royalties or taxes 
from resource extraction and thus economically rational 
decisions could be made, with direct compensation being 
provided to affected groups if necessary. It is therefore pro-
posed that all onshore gas and oil exploitation rights should 
lie with local authorities, though local authorities could pri-
vatise such rights if they wished.
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Lifestyle regulation
The arguments for decentralisation also apply to regula-
tion. Although the author would prefer to reduce the ex-
tent of regulation in general, the power to regulate would 
clearly still exist within government. However, the govern-
ment should divest itself of such powers in relation to a 
large number of areas. Broadly, these areas would involve 
the provision of non-tradable services and other controls 
on lifestyles. For example, the following would become the 
responsibility of local government:
• all aspects of alcohol licensing provisions and licensed 
premises opening times
• regulations in relation to smoking in private places 
(such as pubs and cafés) and public places (such as 
streets and local-government-owned parks)
• provisions related to gambling
• shop opening hours (including Sunday trading rules)
There has been a great deal of controversy about such 
issues in recent years. However, there is no reason why de-
cisions about such matters should take place at national 
level. Taking decisions about such forms of regulation at 
local level would allow regulations to be better matched to 
local preferences and allow people to compare outcomes 
between regulated and deregulated areas of the country. 
It would allow more experimentation and copying of ap-
proaches that worked best. Localisation would also allow 
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foot voting by those who wished to live in more liberal or 
more conservative local authority areas.
Policing
Currently, policing is the responsibility of directly elected 
police and crime commissioners covering areas that cross 
local authority boundaries. This is confusing for the elec-
torate and the level of turnout in the elections for police 
and crime commissioners (just 15 per cent at the 2012 
elections) would suggest that effective accountability in 
this crucial government function is low. The structure of 
policing is broadly determined at national level and this 
responsibility should be transferred to the local level. This 
is not only important for improving accountability, it is 
also important because different areas have very different 
policing needs.
Although responsibility should be transferred to the 
local level, it does not follow that there should be a police 
authority in every local government area. It is important 
that local governments can form police authorities with 
neighbouring areas because of the mobile nature of crime 
and because of the awkward geographical shape of some 
local authorities: Buckinghamshire, for example, is just 
ten miles wide at its narrowest point.
However, the principles expressed above suggest that 
local authorities should have clear accountability and re-
sponsibility for policing. This would not stop local author-
ities combining together to create regional police forces, 
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but such decisions should be taken by local authorities 
themselves so that it is clear to electors who should be held 
responsible for performance. Indeed, Buckinghamshire 
has a joint fire authority with Milton Keynes, a decision 
that belongs in the hands of the two local authorities (a 
county council and unitary authority, respectively) and 
not the national government. A similar approach could be 
followed with policing.
Housing and planning
The RUK government could retain a role providing cash 
support for individuals who cannot afford housing. With 
regard to the provision of housing, local authorities would 
be free to build homes, though definitely not encouraged 
to do so. Furthermore, they would have to do so within the 
financial constraints proposed below.
However, local authorities should have much greater 
freedom when it comes to land-use planning systems. If this 
function were localised, which would involve the repeal of 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1947, there would be 
strong incentives for local authorities to introduce mar-
ket-based planning systems through which residents would 
be compensated for the loss of environmental amenities 
when development takes place. Such an approach would 
give local authorities an incentive to grow the tax base, 
ensure an alignment of the interests of residents and devel-
opers and help ensure that development balanced efficiency 
and environmental costs in a rational way.
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8 FURTHER FISCAL DECENTRALISATION: 
REVENUE RAISING
Local authority revenue-raising requirements
As has been discussed above, fiscal decentralisation must 
take place in respect of both taxation and spending if it is 
to be effective. With some possible exceptions discussed 
below, spending in the local authority area should be en-
tirely met from taxes raised locally. A crucial principle is 
that local authorities must be able to decide both the level 
of taxes and which taxes to levy, within some loose limits.
This immediately leads to the question of how much 
money would have to be raised locally. A trivial increase in 
the amount that has to be raised does not necessarily lead 
to important questions about the appropriate tax base, 
but a significant increase would do so.
Currently, business rates raise around £27bn and coun-
cil tax around £28bn, a total of £55bn.1 Business rates are 
currently collected and set nationally, though this system is 
set to be liberalised a little. Around half of the business rate 
total is absorbed into general government revenue streams, 
1 http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/pubs/March2015EFO_18-03-webv1 
.pdf
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which helps finance central government grants to local au-
thorities, and the other half is retained by local authorities.
It is difficult to define relevant local authority expendi-
ture precisely because some is financed by specific grants 
and user charges. However, business rates and council tax 
make up roughly half of all local government spending in 
England. At first sight, in order to maintain spending at 
current levels, local authorities would need to double their 
revenue raising to around £100bn even if they had total 
control of business rates. However, it has been proposed 
that mainstream schools’ funding will be directed through 
parents to schools, bypassing the local authority financing 
system altogether. This would reduce total local authority 
spending by £30bn.2 Although it has also been proposed 
that local authorities should become responsible for work-
ing-age welfare, this would be financed through central gov-
ernment (see below). Overall, it would appear that a modest 
total increase in local government revenue raising would be 
necessary, perhaps of the order 25 per cent.
Local authority revenue sources
As Packer and Sinclair (2015) suggest:
The objective for local taxes should be that they align the 
incentives of sub-national government with the econom-
ic interests of the wider community. 
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/la-and-school-expenditure 
-financial-year-2012-to-2013
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This may be achieved by changing the tax base to one which 
is broader and also involves levies on natural resource ex-
ploitation. A narrow tax base can lead to local authorities 
attempting to raise taxes on one part of the electorate to 
finance spending that will benefit other parts of the elec-
torate and thus lead to rent seeking. Indeed, this problem 
was presciently anticipated by Bastable (1895) in his great 
work on public finance. The use of a broad tax base should 
also ensure that the local authority has an incentive to 
provide good conditions for businesses to flourish as well 
as ensuring that local authorities can reap the benefits of 
migration rather than just the costs. For the reasons ex-
plained by Packer and Sinclair (2015), capital taxes would 
be very difficult to administer at local level. Arguably the 
same applies to income tax – see below.
Further details are beyond the scope of this Readings, 
but it is proposed that, in principle, local authorities 
should mainly raise revenue from a combination of a 
broad-based consumption tax, property and land taxes 
and some other levies. The property tax should not be 
progressive but should be approximately proportional to 
the value of the property and it should be paid directly 
by tenants or explicitly charged by landlords to tenants. 
There should also be a fixed relationship between residen-
tial and business property taxes. This would mean that 
any increase in spending would necessitate a rise in the 
taxes paid by the whole resident population at least to 
some extent. As discussed above, a tax specifically on 
tourists could help finance public goods for tourists. This 
could take the form of a levy on hotel occupancy.
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In summary, the following tax options should be avail-
able to local authorities:
• taxes modelled on the current council tax
• land value taxes
• taxes on business property
• natural resource levies
• consumption taxes
• tourist taxes
In addition, local authorities could be allowed to vary 
the rate of income tax, though this would be collected by 
central government and redistributed to local authorities. 
There would be difficulties in using local income taxes be-
cause of the difficulties involved in defining residence for 
those with more than one dwelling (see Bastable 1895). This 
is a problem that causes difficulties for national authorities 
and would cause even more difficulties within a nation.
Realistically, district councils and other lower-level 
authorities such as parishes would have to finance their 
spending through a precept on a tax that was easy to vary 
according to the place of residence of the individual such 
as one of the property taxes.
Local authorities would also have the power to reduce 
taxes for groups of residents and businesses that wished 
to opt out of local services and provide their own services.
Redistribution
One of the justifications for the centralised system of gov-
ernment in the UK is the need for redistribution. Currently, 
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the government works out the resources each local au-
thority area should need in order to provide a given set of 
services and then deducts the amount that can be raised 
locally through a given level of taxes. The idea of the redis-
tribution system is that each local government area should 
be able to provide the same level of services with the same 
level of taxes.
It is worthwhile comparing two local authorities in 
order to illustrate the level of redistribution as well as the 
scale of local authority support from central government 
more generally. Birmingham City Council spends a total 
of just over £3bn. About two-thirds of this is made up of 
central government transfers or grants of various kinds 
(including the uniform business rate).3 Dorset County 
Council spends around £267m, of which nearly £200m 
(nearly three-quarters) is financed by council tax.4 There 
have been various forms of redistribution within the local 
government finance system since 1929 (see Sandford 2014).
The degree of redistribution within the local govern-
ment system has increased as the need for it has decreased. 
3 See http://www.birmingham.gov.uk/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobhe 
ader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition& 
blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1223582655783&ssbi 
nary=true&blobheadervalue1=attachment%3B+filename%3D8292Coun 
cil_Tax_Booklet_2015.pdf. Of course, even an area which is receiving 
government grants may simply be receiving money back that citizens 
have paid in general taxes (in the same way as the UK government receives 
grants from the EU out of the general pool of taxes that comprises the EU’s 
resources). However, the important point is to match revenue-raising and 
spending responsibilities more closely.
4 https://www.dorsetforyou.com/article/418043/Dorset-County-Council 
-Tax-201516
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Much welfare and health provision was previously pro-
vided at the local level and is now financed and provided 
nationally. It is also proposed above that education is 
removed from local government finance, with funds ef-
fectively being raised by central government and provided 
directly to parents. In short, if people are poor, then the 
general provision of income top-ups by government will 
provide for such needs. Furthermore, finance for health 
and education would be provided nationally on a basis de-
termined by the RUK government and this could include 
higher levels of support, for example, for poorer parents. It 
is not clear that further redistribution is necessary except 
in very particular circumstances to a small number of 
local authorities.
Following this logic, there is one area of spending for 
which the relevant taxes should not be raised locally: 
working-age welfare. A local authority area with high 
levels of working-age welfare claimants is also likely to 
have a low tax base. Any minimum income to be received 
by individuals should be determined by national and not 
local government and financed from national govern-
ment taxes.5 However, the management of working-age 
welfare would be devolved in order to take advantage of 
local knowledge and local differences. To set in place the 
right incentive structures, it is also important to ensure 
that the cash grant to local authorities to top up the in-
comes of, and provide services to, those on working-age 
5 The national government may wish to vary the minimum income accord-
ing to the cost of living in different local areas.
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welfare is fixed in advance so that any gains from suc-
cessful programmes accrue to local authorities. The 
principles that should be followed are that the function 
should be devolved and should be financed nationally, 
but that working-age welfare should be financed in such 
a way that local areas benefit from managing the prob-
lem effectively.
Local government borrowing rules
Currently, most local authority borrowing is guaranteed by 
the UK government through the Public Works Loan Board. 
In return, there are considerable powers of intervention by 
government in the finances of local authorities. It would 
be preferable if central government did not guarantee debt 
and if there were less intervention in local government 
debt management.
The principle should be established that, in general, 
local authorities can borrow for capital projects, but that 
they must be entirely responsible for that debt. If a local 
authority could not repay debt, it would find it difficult 
to raise further money for capital projects, but current 
spending should not be affected if this is financed entirely 
through taxation. Local authorities could also raise funds 
by securitising revenues from investment projects (for ex-
ample, by issuing bonds, to be serviced by road tolls).
As far as current spending is concerned, it is reasonable 
to expect local authorities to keep reserves to deal with 
cyclical fluctuations in revenue but some borrowing could 
be permitted (for example, up to 5 per cent of current 
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spending in any given year with a maximum debt level 
of 10 per cent of spending). It may be reasonable to have 
backstop limits on debt for both capital and current ex-
penditure. However, a firmly established no-bailout prin-
ciple is more important than government rules about the 
level of debt (see Blankart 2015). In a major study, Rodden 
(2006) shows that successful decentralisation requires 
that sub-central levels of government have their own 
sources of general purpose tax revenue6 and also that it 
is common knowledge to voters that local government is 
responsible for its own debts. This principle must be estab-
lished strongly, both for local government and for Scotland 
and RUK – there should be no federal responsibility for the 
debts of any other governmental unit. There should also 
be no national responsibility (RUK, Scotland, etc.) for local 
government debts.
6 Alternatively, the central government should dominate taxation and regu-
late borrowing, which has, of course, been ruled out as an option.
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9 CONCLUSION
The UK is a very centralised state. This is especially so for a 
country that is so large in terms of both population and na-
tional income. Indeed, among the G7, it is easily the most 
centralised country as measured by the proportion of tax-
ation raised below central government level. Government 
spending is also very centralised in Britain, and, further-
more, local government is heavily constrained or directed 
by central government regulation.
Economic performance could be improved significant-
ly not only through the decentralisation of revenue raising 
but also through more decentralisation of spending deci-
sions and regulatory functions. Furthermore, a process of 
decentralisation of responsibility to the local level would 
help ensure that services and regulation were better 
matched to local preferences and circumstances. It would 
also create greater competition between local authorities: 
voters could move from one local authority to another if 
their own authority was ineffective. The erosion of the tax 
base that would result from such decisions would provide 
the right incentives for local government to be efficient 
and effective. Empirical evidence confirms the theoretical 
CONCLUSION
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work and suggests that decentralisation would be espe-
cially beneficial in the UK context.
Current UK government proposals to devolve power to 
local government are piecemeal, arbitrary, do not involve 
proper local fiscal responsibility and may well lead to the 
centralisation of political power at a higher level of local 
government than exists currently.
Wide-ranging responsibilities should be moved from 
central government to local government level. These would 
include areas such as lifestyle regulation, welfare for those 
of working age, policing, housing and land-use planning 
and natural resource exploitation. Other policy areas such 
as health and education may require some limited local gov-
ernment oversight, but responsibility in these fields should 
be decentralised further to civil society and families, with 
the government maintaining a role in providing finance.
It is essential that incentives are properly aligned with-
in any reform. Local government should raise taxes to 
finance all its functions, other than welfare for people of 
working age, which would be financed by a fixed central 
government grant. A variety of tax options would be avail-
able but it is important that, in principle, taxes are raised 
from a wide base to prevent citizens demanding spending 
financed by a narrow group of taxpayers. Also, just as re-
sponsibility for the regulation of natural resource extrac-
tion should lie with local government, local government 
should decide whether and how to tax natural resource 
revenues and it should receive any such taxes.
In addition to government being far too centralised 
in the UK, the current devolution settlement is unstable. 
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There is a bias in favour of bigger government and a high de-
gree of representation without taxation within Westmin-
ster. This has arisen because devolution has been granted 
to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and yet members 
of parliament from those nations sit in the UK parliament 
and can vote on issues that do not affect their constituents. 
Indeed, the Celtic nations are actually over-represented in 
the UK parliament in relation to their population when it 
might be expected that they would be under-represented. 
These problems will be exacerbated as the government’s 
proposals for further devolution are implemented.
Various solutions to the problems within the UK’s 
system of governance have been proposed. However, they 
tend to be impractical, add another layer of government, 
add complexity to the system or do not solve the problems 
inherent within the current system. Indeed, some of the 
proposals have two or more of these shortcomings.
The UK should become a federal country. Most respon-
sibilities should be transferred to Scotland and either RUK 
or England, Wales and Northern Ireland separately. The 
federal government would have very few functions, in-
cluding defence, border control and foreign affairs. Sepa-
rate revenue streams would be raised at the federal level 
through federal taxes.
This approach would return the UK government to per-
forming the kind of functions that it performed for most 
of the period since the Union before so much government 
intervention in economic life became the norm. It should 
be attractive to those who believe in small government, 
those who believe in localism and also, as a ‘second-best’ 
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option to those who support independence for Scotland (or 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland). 
In light of the experience of other federal systems, 
which have seen a tendency for powers to flow back to the 
centre over time, there would be mechanisms put in place 
to prevent re-centralisation. It is suggested that unanimity 
be required among the federal government and the Scot-
tish and RUK governments before powers are transferred 
to the federal level. The federal parliament would be small 
and meet much less frequently than the current UK par-
liament. The number of federal government departments 
would also be very small.
Crucially, there should be an explicit compact between 
the federal government and the Scottish and RUK govern-
ments that the former will never bail out the latter, either 
explicitly, or implicitly through the central bank. Similarly, 
local government would never be bailed out. Together with 
the effective alignment of revenue-raising and spending 
powers, this principle must be at the heart of any devo-
lution and decentralisation process that aims to ensure 
stability, accountability and prudent fiscal management 
at all levels of government.
The guiding principle of all these proposals would be 
that of subsidiarity. Defined properly, this means that power 
should be exercised at the lowest level possible. In general, 
the bias should be in favour of over-decentralisation.
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